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An analysis of financial criteria used in case
adjudication by the Directorate for Industrial Security
Clearance Review (DISCR) was conducted to determine those
financial factors most relevant in granting or denying
security clearances to industrial personnel.
It was concluded that the underlying cause of debt and
subsequent handling thereof by the applicant were more
influential than the type, number or dollar amount of debt in
determining case outcome. Applicants whose debts were due to
circumstances beyond their control and who made good faith
efforts to resolve their debts were more likely to be granted
clearances than applicants whose debts were due to
carelessness or financial mismanagement and who made little or
no attempt to resolve their debts.
Ten financial factors most highly correlated with case
outcome were identified and grouped into four main categories.
Adjudicators were found to determine case outcomes in
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The United States Department of Defense (DOD) procures
many goods and services from private industry. In the
process, industrial firms frequently produce or handle
sensitive documents, the unauthorized disclosure of which
could result in damage to the US national security.
Consequently, DOD must ensure that only trustworthy and
reliable individuals are permitted access to such documents.
Sensitive documents are classified at one of three
classification levels: "top secret" (most sensitive), "secret"
(sensitive), or "confidential" (least sensitive). Individuals
who require access to such classified information must first
obtain a security clearance. In this thesis, a person in
private industry who requires access to DOD classified
information and applies for a clearance shall be termed an
"industrial applicant" or simply "applicant." DOD determines
the trustworthiness of industrial applicants through the
industrial security clearance process.
The Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO)
in Columbus, OH, coordinates the industrial security clearance
adjudication process and reports to the Director of the
Defense Investigative Service (DIS). If the Personnel
Investigations Center (PIC), which also reports to the
Director of DIS, uncovers no derogatory information or issues
(e.g., financial problems, mental illness, drug or alcohol
abuse) in an applicant's background, then DISCO will issue the
clearance. If PIC does find significant derogatory
information, then DISCO will forward the "issue" case to the
Directorate for Industrial Security Clearance Review (DISCR)
in Columbus, OH.
If DISCR's office in Columbus cannot grant the clearance,
then the case is forwarded to DISCR's second location in
Arlington, VA. If DISCR's Arlington division cannot grant the
clearance, then the applicant is notified as to the reasons
for clearance denial and is entitled to further administrative
review. If clearance is still denied, the applicant may
appeal the decision. The points in the process at which
clearances may be granted are referred to as stages, levels,
or segments, with DISCO the first stage or lowest level, and
reviews and appeals at DISCR the final stages or highest
levels
.
DISCR is the central adjudication facility (CAF) for
industrial clearances. (The military and civil services have
their own CAFs.) The main function of DISCR's two locations
is the adjudication of industrial security clearances, or the
determination based on evidence both favorable and unfavorable
as to whether granting access to classified information for a
particular industrial applicant is in the national interest
[Ref. l:p.3]. While both locations utilize the same written
guidelines in adjudicating cases during the adjudication
process, only DISCR's office in Arlington may ultimately deny
a clearance. Adjudicators are personnel who adjudicate
clearances. The three types of adjudicators employed at DISCR
(listed from the lowest to highest adjudicative level) are
personnel security specialists, administrative judges, and
members of appeal boards. This thesis examines the criteria
used by administrative judges in adjudicating cases involving
financial issues, factors or matters (e.g., liens, judgments,
indebtedness, bankruptcy).
B . PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze cases adjudicated
by the Directorate for Industrial Security Clearance Review
(DISCR) in order to determine empirically the financial
criteria used in granting or denying security clearances to
industrial applicants.
C. DISCUSSION
The Stilwell Commission, in its report on DOD security
policy and procedures, recommended the "enunciation of more
precise criteria" in the adjudication process, noting that
"this is a fertile area for research, as there is scant
empirical data available on which to base sound standards."
[Ref. 2:p. 36] This thesis should help fill some of this
research void by empirically determining the financial
criteria used in adjudicating industrial security clearances.
Also, in the interest of greater efficiency in an
environment of increasing budgetary constraints, senior
personnel at DIS have commented that their investigators
should not waste their time investigating those financial
issues which, even under a worst case scenario, would not
result in the denial of a security clearance [Ref 3]. DIS
Special Agents investigating financial issues would also be
more likely to view their assignments as meaningful and
"making a difference" if these unproductive avenues of
investigation were eliminated. To this end, DIS approached
the Personnel Security Research and Education Center
(PERSEREC), an organization "established to apply behavioral
science research methodology to the problems of personnel
security," [Ref. 4:abstract] to design a study whose purpose
would be to determine empirically the financial criteria used
by DISCR in granting or denying security clearances to
industrial personnel. PERSEREC agreed to sponsor the study,
which was performed as thesis research and reported in this
document
.
In addition to helping DIS investigators more effectively
focus their efforts, this study, by clarifying which financial
factors and thresholds thereof are used at the final stages of
case adjudication at DISCR, could help to identify those
financial factors that should be considered at earlier stages
of the case adjudication process. If more security clearances
were resolved at a lower level in the case adjudication
4
process, savings in time, money, and personnel should result.
In addition, people at higher levels in the adjudication
process would be able to focus their energies on those cases
most deserving of attention. If the adjudicative criteria
used at the various levels differ from those suggested in
written policy guidance, then those particular levels might
want to consider whether written directives need to be revised
or whether their adjudicators need to adjust their approach to
more closely adhere to that suggested in the guidelines.
Finally, if DIS investigators concentrated their attention
on those areas of interest to DISCR adjudicators, then DISCR
would benefit through the receipt of more relevant information
from DIS. Case adjudication at DISCR may then proceed more
smoothly and efficiently with a minimum of delays due to lack
of information.
D. OBJECTIVES
The primary research question in this thesis is "What
financial criteria are used by DISCR in granting or denying
security clearances to industrial applicants?" Financial
criteria include not only types of financial factors (e.g.,
bankruptcy, indebtedness, judgments, liens) but also the
thresholds of those factors (e.g., dollar amounts, number and
recency of occurrences) used in adjudication. Subsidiary
research questions include the following:
1. Do the actual factors used differ from those outlined
in DOD Directive 5220.6 [Ref. 1]? If yes, how? Do the
results of this study suggest the revision of current
adjudicative practice to conform to the guidelines or revision
of the guidelines themselves?
2
.
Do the results of this study suggest certain financial
issues which are unproductive in terms of their impact on
adjudicative outcomes? For example, are there financial
issues that, even under a worst case scenario, would not
result in adjudicators denying a clearance?
3. Can the results of this study be used by DISCR to
improve the processing and adjudication of cases?
4 . Can the database established as a result of this study
be further utilized to examine other relevant areas of
research, such as automated credit scoring?
E . APPROACH
An empirical method was chosen in which redacted case
summaries (i.e., cases in which identifying information such
as the applicant's name and social security number have been
deleted) were analyzed as objectively as possible to determine
the factors having the greatest impact on adjudication
decisions. These factors were then compared to those
specified in the applicable written directives.
Case analysis was used as the main research methodology in
this study for the following two reasons. (1) The redacted
case summaries were easily accessible through DISCR, and (2)
a given case summary conveniently recapitulates in one
document the testimony and/or evidence considered by the
administrative judge in adjudicating the case.
Financial cases chosen for study were reviewed to
determine the financial information they contained. Based
upon this review, a computer codebook was established to
facilitate data entry and retrieval (see Appendix A). Among
the information included in the redacted case summaries was
the applicant's income and expenses, nature of each financial
item (e.g., delinquent debt, bankruptcy, garnishment),
frequency and dollar amount of each item, applicant's
attitude, and adjudicative outcome.
Once each case was analyzed to determine the specific
information contained therein, that information was entered
into a computerized database for additional analysis.
Analyses were performed on the data by using SPSS statistical
software in order to determine the degree to which different
types of financial factors were correlated with adjudicative
outcome. For example, if every case involving bankruptcy had
an adjudicative outcome of "clearance denied" while most cases
without bankruptcy had an adjudicative outcome of "clearance
granted," then there would appear to be a very strong
relationship between the incidence of bankruptcy in a case and
the adjudicative outcome. One might conclude that bankruptcy
was a primary financial factor used in case adjudication.
As a final note, many biodata items other than those
previously noted, particularly those of a nonfinancial nature,
were encoded in the database established for this study.
Among those additional items were the applicant's age, sex,
and marital status; dates of hearings and appeals, including
all intermediate determinations; and provision for other
nonfinancial case issues, such as drug abuse and mental
illness. The database was intended to be broad in scope to
facilitate additional analysis by others, easy expansion for
future studies, and the determination of such items as the
financial profile of the average applicant denied a clearance.
F. SCOPE
As previously noted, this study examines the financial
criteria used in making clearance determinations at DISCR
through analysis of redacted case summaries. Both the subject
matter and the decision to use data drawn from the redacted
case summaries affect the scope of the study, as illustrated
below.
1. Industrial Cases Only
DISCR only adjudicates security clearances for DOD
industrial applicants. Military and DOD civil service
personnel are adjudicated by other organizations. At the
present time, DISCR is the only CAF that prepares case
summaries and indexes to the cases that it has reviewed by
issue.
2. Cases Adjudicated by Administrative Judges Only
Only those industrial cases adjudicated by an
administrative judge at DISCR were examined, vice those cases
in which (1) clearance was approved at a lower level in the
review process or (2) clearance was denied by DISCR and the
applicant did not request review of the case by an
administrative judge. In other words, every case examined in
this study involved both (1) denial of clearance by DISCR and
(2) review by an administrative judge at the applicant's
request. This restriction was necessary due to the
unavailability of information on cases adjudicated at lower
levels in the clearance process. One advantage, however, is
that the cases heard by administrative judges are the most
controversial, requiring keen judgment as to whether the
factors in the case do or do not support the granting of a
clearance. Consequently, such cases are considered to be the
most useful in helping to distinguish the specific financial
factors, and thresholds thereof, which determine whether or
not clearances are granted.
3. Financial and Financial/Unreliability Cases Only
All cases designated as pertaining to a financial
issue by the letter "L" in the "Index to Cases" volumes
published by DISCR were included for study. Also, since most
adjudicators consider the existence of financial difficulties
indicative of general immaturity and carelessness on the part
of the applicant, the great majority of financial cases were
encoded not only with an "L" for their financial content but
also with the letter "I" for "poor judgment, unreliability, or
untrustworthiness . " [Ref. l:p. 6] Consequently, those
financial cases encoded "LI" were also included for study,
along with those financial cases encoded "L", to ensure a
representative and meaningful population size. Financial
cases involving other issues, such as psychiatric illness
(encoded "LJ" ) or drug abuse (encoded "LN" ) , were not included
for study, so as to facilitate the isolation of financial
criteria used in adjudicating security clearances.
4. Cases Adjudicated Under New DOD Directive Only
Only those cases adjudicated under DOD Directive
5220.6 dated August 12, 1985 [Ref. 1] were included for study,
because the new directive introduced major changes in
adjudication procedure at DISCR. (1) It revised the
definition of financial criterion "L"; (2) it established new
adjudication policy for determining the degree of financial
irresponsibility displayed by applicants; and (3) it altered
the role of appeal boards in case adjudication. The
aforementioned changes may have affected the adjudication of
cases to some unknown extent.
Two other considerations reinforced the decision to
use only more recent cases. First, almost all cases
adjudicated prior to 1985 in which clearances were granted
resulted in "split" decisions, whereby applicants were cleared
for access to information up to, but not above, a stated
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classification level (e.g., secret, confidential). In
contrast, cases adjudicated after 1984, including those used
in this study, make no such distinction. Applicants granted
clearances are cleared for access to information up to the
classification level requested by their employers. Second,
the remoteness in time of earlier financial cases, which were
available as early as 1966, may have reduced their current
relevancy due to possible changes in financial attitudes and
standards in society.
All cases examined in this study were adjudicated
under the same guidelines, thereby enhancing case
comparability
.
5. Cases Issuing Final Determinations Only
Only those cases considered "closed", in which final
determinations were issued stating unequivocally whether a
security clearance was granted or denied to the applicant,
were included for study. Cases in which final outcomes were
unknown could not, obviously, be useful in a study attempting




There were several important limitations of this study.
First, any inaccuracy in the "Index to Cases" volumes used to
identify financial cases may have reduced the number of cases
chosen for this study. For example, if a financial case were
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coded "M" instead of "L" in the index, then the case could not
have been properly pulled for analysis. A random sample of
cases was studied to provide some measure of index accuracy.
Second, this study used case analysis to determine the
financial criteria used by DISCR in case adjudication as
opposed to interviews or questionnaires. A given case summary
contains only that information chosen for inclusion by the
administrative judge who wrote it. As a result, only that
information contained in the case write-ups was examined; any
other information, such as nonverbal communication (e.g., "body
language") at the hearing, credit reports, related
correspondence before or after the hearing, exhibits presented
at the hearing, and any other case file information not
written as part of the case determination was not examined,
regardless of how pertinent or objective in nature.
The financial information chosen for inclusion in each
case summary varied to some extent from case to case,
depending on several factors, including the following:
(1) the applicant's financial situation (i.e., not every
applicant had a bankruptcy)
;
(2) the reasons for denial of clearance (e.g., a
delinquent debt satisfied ten years ago may not have
been a reason for denial and so was not addressed)
;
(3) combining or "lumping" of data (e.g., three
delinquent debts of $20, $30 and $40 listed as "$90
of delinquent debts"); and
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(4) personal discretion of the administrative judge
(e.g., some administrative judges noted exhibits
presented at the hearing or other miscellaneous
case file information, such as monthly income and
expenses of the applicant, in greater detail than
others )
.
While the variations in financial information from case to
case impaired case comparability to some extent--the true
extent of which is unknown since any excluded information
cannot be determined without examining the original case file
--there was enough similarity in case information to permit
meaningful analysis.
In addition, only that financial information encoded under
criterion "L" or "I" was included for study. In other words,
any financial information listed under a different criterion
was not considered. For example, such financially-related
items as "extortion" and "embezzlement" were usually encoded
and adjudicated under criterion "H" for criminal conduct
rather than financial criterion "L." Consequently, meaningful
conclusions could not be drawn from this study for such items.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, all cases used were
redacted, meaning that all identifying information was
removed. Such items as the applicant's name, social security
number, and name of employer were not needed for analysis and
so their omission was of no consequence. Sometimes, however,
when identifying information was deleted, other types of
13
information were also deleted by mistake, such as the type of
debt. Such instances, however, were sufficiently infrequent
so as to not impede a meaningful analysis of the data.
H. THESIS OUTLINE
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter II highlights recent developments in personnel
security and examines major issues in clearance processing.
Chapter III outlines the major steps in the adjudication
process, and reviews applicable policy and directives. A
description of the database, data collection, and methodology
is provided in Chapter IV, while Chapter V discusses results
and interpretations. Chapter VI presents conclusions of the
study, recommendations, and areas for further research.
Appendix B defines terms having specific meanings within the
context of personnel security. Appendix C lists the main
acronyms used in this thesis.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews the reasons for renewed interest in
national security during the 1980s, provides a chronology of
significant events, and examines major issues in the security
clearance process.
A. RENEWED EMPHASIS ON NATIONAL SECURITY
In response to a series of espionage cases in the eighties
(26 U.S. citizens were convicted of espionage from 1984 to
1986 alone) a number of governmental studies and congressional
hearings were conducted to determine if various national
security procedures needed strengthening [Ref. 5:p. 4]. In
addition, legislation affecting national security procedures
was introduced and some was passed [Ref. 6, 7 and 8]. While
many areas, such as information and physical security, were
examined, the security clearance process was especially
scrutinized, because present and former U.S. governmental and
contractor personnel with access to classified information
played key roles in all recent espionage cases [Ref. 5:p. 1].
A brief chronology of events follows.
B. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN SECURITY
Early eighties: Foreshadowing a decade of increasing
concern over national security, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) issued a series of reports in the early eighties whose
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purpose was a "continuing review of the protection of national
security information." [Ref. 9:p. 1] Each report usually
focused on a particular topic.
March 1983: Amidst controversy, President Reagan's
"National Security Decision Directive 84" (NSDD-84) was issued
and included the following elements: It (1) required the
signing of nondisclosure agreements by all personnel with
access to classified information, (2) required the agreement
of persons with access to the most restricted materials to
prepublication review of their writings, (3) called on
agencies to adopt policies concerning employee contacts with
the media, and (4) authorized the investigative use of
polygraph examinations. Many considered the provisions too
restrictive. [Ref. 6:p. 2]
November 1983: In response to the 1983 arrest of James
Durward Harper, Jr., later convicted of espionage involving a
DOD contractor facility, the DOD Industrial Security Committee
("Harper Committee") was convened to "analyze the
effectiveness of current industrial security requirements and
develop recommendations for program improvement." [Ref. 10 :p.
vi]
April 1985: In response to the arrests of William Holden
Bell, members of the Walker family, and others later convicted
of espionage, congressional hearings were held on federal
government security clearance programs "to evaluate the
efforts by several agencies of the executive branch to
16
establish the integrity and reliability of persons applying
for and working in Federal positions and contractor
employment." [Ref. 11 :p. 1] The hearings were extremely
broad in scope and surveyed programs in all federal agencies,
both DOD and non-DOD.
June 1985: Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
established the DOD Security Review Commission ("Stilwell
Commission" ) whose task was to examine and make
recommendations concerning DOD security policies and
procedures. The commission's report of recommendations,
Keeping the Nation' s Secrets , set the future course for DOD
security policy. The commission believed that existing
security procedures were basically sound but needed
improvements in their implementation. [Ref. 2]
1986-1989: Many federal agencies and departments, both
DOD and non-DOD, independently investigated their own security
clearance programs to evaluate their effectiveness. These
agencies included the Air Force, State Department, Department
of Energy, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission [Ref. 12 through
17]. Weaknesses discovered in those programs were very
similar to those in DOD.
February 1987: The House Select Committee on Intelligence
issued a report addressing "serious security deficiencies
[that] exist in a number of areas within the U.S. intelligence
community." [Ref. 5:p. 2] This report disagreed with the
Stilwell Commission that existing security procedures were
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sound and suggested their complete overhaul. In October 1988,
the same committee issued a status report which recognized
some initial improvements but noted "the lack of a dedicated
commitment of management to provide the necessary leadership
and resources" as a barrier to further progress [Ref. 18 :p.
2]. The status report also reiterated the need to move beyond
mere improvement of the existing security screening system to
a thorough reexamination of its "underlying philosophy, focus
and methods." [Ref. 18:p. 3]
March 1990: Congressional hearings were held to examine
a proposed executive order, first drafted in November 1987,
which would rescind the right of federal employees and
contractors denied clearances to be informed of the charges
against them and respond to those charges. The purpose of the
order was to provide uniformity in clearance processing for
all federal and contractor personnel. The order is still
pending (as of September 1991). [Ref. 7]
June 1990: A bill titled The Counterintelligence
Improvements Act of 1990 was introduced by the Jacobs Panel,
featuring the following provisions: (1) forfeiture of profits
from espionage, (2) new criminal penalties for possession of
espionage devices and selling of top secret materials to
foreign governments, (3) rewards for reporting espionage, (4)
amending the Right to Financial Privacy Act to increase access
to financial information for security clearance
18
investigations, and more. Senate hearings were held in July
1990. [Ref. 8]
C. GENERAL WEAKNESSES IN THE CLEARANCE PROCESS
This is the first of three sections highlighting major
issues concerning security clearances addressed during the
"decade of the spy." While space limitations preclude an
exhaustive examination of all major issues concerning the
clearance process, the issues covered were among the most
problematic, significant, or controversial. Issues are
divided into three categories: general, adjudicative, and
financial. This section covers broad, general issues.
1. Lengthy Clearance Processing Times
In 1982, processing delays for two types of personnel
security investigations (PSI)--the background investigation
(BI) and the national agency check (NAC)--were estimated to
average 130 days and 73 days, respectively [Ref. 9:p. 8]. The
Harper Commission stated, "It is clear that the current
process which can take as long as three years or more is not
acceptable for the Government and can create a hardship for
both the contractor and the individual whose clearance has
been suspended." [Ref. 10 :p. 22] Some studies recommended
that greater resources be allocated to DIS, even at the
expense of other programs [Ref. 2 and 18 :p. 3]. For example,
the Select Committee on Intelligence stated that "the United
States has spent billions of dollars to acquire
19
technologically advanced means of intelligence collection but
seems unwilling to invest in the relatively few millions of
dollars necessary to better protect them from compromise."
[Ref. 5:p. 12] Another solution suggested was the use of
interim clearances.
In fiscal year (FY) 1989, DISCO increased the use of
interim security clearances with the following positive
results: (1) out of 82,445 requests for interim clearances,
69,331 were issued, usually within 5 days, (2) only .06
percent of the interim clearances granted were subsequently
withdrawn, and (3) approximately 45 days of clearance
processing time were eliminated, thereby saving contractors,
and ultimately the government, an estimated $182 million [Ref.
19:p. 15]. The steady growth in automated information systems
should further speed clearance processing time [Ref. 19:p.l].
2. Proliferation of Clearances
From 1980 to 1985, the number of security clearances
increased by an estimated 40 percent [Ref. 5:p. 12]. Reasons
included relaxing of the "need-to-know" principle and
contractor reluctance to withdraw clearances. Subsequently,
in June 1985, the Secretary of Defense mandated a 10 percent
reduction in the number of security clearances outstanding for
DOD and defense contractors in each classification level--top
secret, secret, and confidential—by October 1985. Not only
was the original goal surpassed by 6 percent for all
classification levels combined (although the goal was not
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achieved for each individual classification level), but an
overall reduction of almost 34 percent was achieved by October
1986. An additional requirement to reduce requests for
clearances by 10 percent was also met. [Ref. 20:p. 2]
3. Backlog of Periodic Reinvestigations
Various studies emphasized the importance of periodic
reinvestigations by pointing out that "...the greater and more
probable threat to DOD security is the individual who is
recruited [for espionage] after he has been cleared." [Ref.
2:p. 37] Even more emphatic was the Harper Commission, which
stated that "...personnel security risks commence after a
clearance is granted (and access is afforded) and increase
significantly thereafter." [Ref. 10:p. 87] A Senate
Intelligence Committee report noted the following:
Most [spies] are amateurs, and few, if any, enter the
military or civilian employment with the intent to commit
espionage. Neither do they necessarily behave at the
time of entry in ways considered unsuitable. [Ref
18:p.l8]
Congress appropriated $25 million in FY 1986 to reduce
the backlog of periodic reinvestigations [Ref. 20:p. 3]. The
number of reinvestigations conducted increased "from a low of
208 in FY 1982 to more than 80,000 in FY 1987." [Ref. 21:p.
62] By FY 1989, DIS had completely eliminated the backlog of
top secret reinvestigations and had begun to eliminate the
backlog of secret level reinvestigations [Ref. 19:p. 17].
21
4. Overclassification of Documents
Some estimates put the number of classified documents
in existence into the trillions [Ref. 5:p. 13] 1 The Stilwell
Commission, however, estimated the number at a more realistic
100 million as of 1985 [Ref. 2:p. 19]. In any case, appeals
were made to those who classified documents to reconsider
whether unauthorized disclosure of a given document would
realistically damage national security so that protection
efforts would be concentrated on those documents most in need
of restricted access.
5. Lack of Managerial Involvement
The Stilwell Commission noted that in every case of
recent espionage, "there has been evidence of conduct known to
the commander/supervisor which, if recognized and reported,
might have had a bearing on the continued access of the
individual." [Ref. 2:p. 44] The Commission went on to
recommend the implementation of "reliability" programs
requiring supervisors to perform initial and recurring
evaluations to certify that subordinates are fit for
anticipated duties [Ref. 2:p. 44]. The Harper Committee
echoed the importance of encouraging "industry to initially
screen employees and be continually alert to behavioral
changes and other circumstances that may affect an employee's
continued suitability for classified access." [Ref. 10:pp. 2-
3]
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The House Select Committee on Intelligence noted that
"frequently it is difficult to ascertain the possibility of
espionage based on lifestyle alone, even when background
investigations and reinvestigations are conducted properly,"
and emphasized the importance of "encouraging security
awareness by fellow employees, who can report patterns of work
activity potentially associated with espionage." [Ref. 18 :p.
11] The Committee also quoted a senior DOD personnel security
official. "There should be an opportunity to share problems
at early stages with a supervisor or counselor who might be
able to help, before the problem becomes desperate,
unshareable, and a motive for illegal behavior like espionage
develops." [Ref. 18:p. 11]
6. Limited Scope of Secret-Level Investigations
The Stilwell Commission recommended "expansion of the
investigative scope for a secret clearance to include a credit
check of the subject and written inquiries to past and present
employer ( s) . " [Ref. 2: p. 9] The Harper Committee concurred
[Ref 10:p. xii], as did the House Intelligence Committee,
which strongly attacked the insufficiency of the NAC as the
sole requirement for access to information classified at the
secret or confidential level.
It is inexcusable that the majority of people who require
access to classified information are cleared at the secret
level, and for these individuals, the government conducts
only a NAC, seeking no financial or employment history
information. The Committee finds this failure to act
inexcusable. Testimony from professional security experts
was unanimous that these two elementary criteria should
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have been made a part of the NAC years ago. [Ref. 18 :p.
6]
D. MAJOR ISSUES IN CLEARANCE ADJUDICATION
This section explores major issues believed to affect the
quality of the adjudicative process.
1. Screening Methods Used in Adjudication
Judgmental and empirical screening are the two main
methods used in determining personal financial responsibility.
The judgmental method recognizes that "the average behavior of
a category of people does not necessarily indicate the
behavior of a particular individual within that category" and
encourages individual evaluation [Ref. 22: p. 47]. On the
other hand,
unlike the judgmental method, the empirical method, in its
purest form, does not concern itself with the
individuality of the applicant. Credit scoring is an
empirical method of determining personal financial
responsibility. It is the newest method and involves
quantification of the applicant's personal trait variables
to arrive at a score for the individual. The score is
compared to a required standard to determine applicant
approval. [Ref. 22:p. 52]
While the judgmental method is generally considered to
be subjective and the empirical method objective, there is
subjectivity involved in setting the standards, or thresholds,
in the empirical method. Also, standards may discriminate
against certain population groups who may be less likely to
score high in particular rated variables, such as home
ownership, but may be financially responsible nonetheless.
Consequently, "setting a cutoff score for an applicant's
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approval can only be considered objective in the sense of
being consistently applied." [Ref. 22:p. 58]
The clearance process used in DOD is mainly
judgmental, with some empirical aspects. For example, some
thresholds are applied to identify "issue" cases involving
enough derogatory information to require further or expanded
investigation. Investigators, however, are encouraged to
expand any cases if, in their judgment, circumstances so
warrant—even if case data fall under the established
thresholds [Ref. 23]. The trend in DOD adjudication, however,
is toward a more empirical emphasis, as discussed in the next
paragraph.
2. Specificity of Adjudicative Criteria
Many studies recommended that criteria for
adjudicating security clearances be made more specific and
binding on the adjudicator. For example, the Harper Committee
recommended "strengthening the adjudication process through
the establishment of adjudicative standards as opposed to
adjudicative guidelines which shall be uniformly applied
throughout the DOD." [Ref. 10 :p. viii] The Stilwell
Commission concurred, noting that the general nature of
adjudicative criteria made it "possible for different
adjudicators to arrive at different determinations after
applying the same guidelines to a given set of investigative
results." [Ref. 2:p. 35] Civilian security specialists also
advise that "in using background information, you should
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establish some criteria for objective and consistent
evaluation" [Ref . 24 :p. 51] and "to avoid erroneous judgments,
the subjective process of risk appraisal must be given an
objective framework on which appraisers can base their final
judgments." [Ref. 25:p. 52]
In response, more specific and binding adjudicative
criteria, termed "Adjudication Policy," were established in
DOD Directive 5220.6 dated 12 August 1985 for a number of
areas, including financial irresponsibility, criminal and
sexual misconduct, alcohol and drug abuse, and
mental/emotional illness. The newly established criteria list
factors, both for and against the granting of a clearance,
which must be considered by adjudicators in making clearance
decisions. [Ref. l:encl (3)]
3. Written Quality of Reports
One study assessed the writing quality of reports of
investigation, the documents which summarize the investigative
results for each applicant and are the primary material relied
on by adjudicators in making clearance decisions.
Adjudicators commented on "the inconsistent quality of writing
they reviewed" and agreed "that grammatical, spelling, usage,
and punctuation errors caused them to question the
thoroughness and intelligence of the field agent." [Ref.
26 :p. 19] The study cautioned that "the negative perceptions
associated with poorly written reports may cause adjudicators
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during their decision process to unconsciously assess field
agents as a mitigating factor." [Ref. 26:p. 19]
4. Connotative Effects of Language
Research into the effects of language used in reports
of investigation indicated that:
Adjudicators responded differently to the connotations of
the language that special agents used. These responses
could have a significant impact on how the case was
adjudicated. Terms like "financial irresponsibility,"
"bankruptcy," "sexual misconduct," "drug abuse," and so on
triggered in adjudicators radically different reactions to
similar kinds of information. [Ref. 26:p. 22]
The study provided the following financial example:
...the words "bankruptcy," "past-due," "collection agency"
triggered in one adjudicator reviewing a PSI containing a
history of significant financial problems ... language
schema that caused the adjudicator to feel that the
subject was irresponsible, dishonest, and would be prone
to financial blackmail. He intended to recommend denial
of clearance. .. In contrast, another adjudicator in the
same adjudication facility was evaluating a PSI with an
almost identical financial profile (in fact, the history
of financial difficulty was more severe). This agent
reacted neutrally to terms like "bankruptcy," "past due,"
and "collection agency." She believed the subject had
merely fallen on bad times and had run into a string of
bad luck. [Ref. 26:p. 22]
The study suggested that "adjudicators need to develop
a better self-consciousness about their own language biases
and the extent to which their adjudication decisions may be
affected by those biases." [Ref. 26:p. 26]
5. Perception of Verbal and Nonverbal Cues
Yet another study examined verbal and nonverbal cues
indicative of deception in investigative interviews. Examples
of possible verbal cues to deception included fewer past tense
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verbs, more first-person pronouns, fewer unique words, fewer
references to specific groups or persons, and less emphasis on
the negative aspects of people or situations [Ref. 27:p. 79].
Possible nonverbal cues to deception included increased
shrugs, more or less posture shifts, and fewer illustrating
hand gestures [Ref. 27:p. 80]. The idea was that persons more
adept at judging truthfulness in applicants would produce more
accurate investigative information. Such information would be
of interest to adjudicators who must determine the security
worthiness of applicants from results of investigative
interviews and/or testimony at administrative hearings. The
study concluded from available research that "humans can often
detect deception at better than chance levels, but not much
better." [Ref. 27:p. 83] In other words, the perception of
verbal and nonverbal cues could have a positive effect on the
information used in adjudication, but not markedly.
6. Training of Adjudicators
In 1985, the Stilwell Commission made the following
comments concerning the training of adjudicators:
DOD requires no formal training for persons performing
adjudicative functions. Indeed, no such training is
conducted beyond an occasional seminar. The application
of adjudication guidelines thus becomes largely a matter
of on-the-job training. Moreover, the grade levels of
adjudicators appear uniformly low, considering the degree
of judgment and skill required. [Ref. 2:p. 35]
One study confirmed that adjudicative tasks, while
varying in complexity from less to more challenging, involved
"primarily complex cognitive capabilities," including
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numerical facility, visual perception, convergent and
divergent reasoning, verbal aptitude, and memorization [Ref.
28:pp. 22-23]. The study also indicated that "as a career
area adjudication has been neglected for many years and has a
requirement for a dynamic enhancement program." [Ref. 28 :p.
ii] Changes in the area of adjudicative training appear
likely as analyses of adjudicator tasks and training continue
[Ref. 29 and 30]
.
7. Due Process in Adjudication
Controvery exists over to what degree, if at all, due
process, as guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution, applies to
the adjudication of security clearances. Pursuant to the 1959
U.S. Supreme Court case of Greene versus McElroy , 360 U.S.
496, which first asserted the right of an individual to review
charges and confront accusers [Ref. 31 :p. 4], Executive Order
10865 was issued. It established the right of any federal
employee or contractor denied a clearance to a written
statement of reasons and chance to respond [Ref. 32]. As
mentioned previously, an executive order proposing to rescind
the foregoing rights was fought on the grounds that it lacked
due process or violated the inherent rights of applicants
[Ref. 7]. At house hearings on the proposed order, Gerry
Sikorski, chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil Service, made
the following statement:
This opportunity to confront our accusers, or at least the
accusations, and to present our case when we are in danger
of losing an interest of great importance to us, is one of
29
the fundamental premises upon which America was founded.
[Ref. 7:p. 1]
Yet, as Emilio Jaksetic, Appeal Board Chairman at
DISCR, pointed out in a preliminary legal analysis,
absent a liberty or property interest, the Due Process
Clause [of the Constitution] does not apply, and the
Government is free to exercise its judgment and discretion
as to what procedural protections, if any, it wishes to
grant to applicants for security clearance. Of course, if
any federal statute applies, then whatever procedural
requirements mandated or required by that statute must
apply. [Ref. 31:p. 169]
In fact, two Supreme Court decisions, both issued in 1988,
addressed the right to a security clearance. A US Supreme
Court opinion concerning the case of Department of the Navy
versus Thomas E. Egan , U.S. Supreme Court 86-1552 (1988),
stated that there was no inherent right to a security
clearance [Ref. 31 :p. 4], while the case of Hill versus
Department of the Air Force, 344 F. 2d 1047 (1988), "went
further in stating that there is no liberty or property
interest in possession of a security clearance." [Ref. 31:p.
6]
In any event, as Jaksetic commented,
absent a rigorous analytical approach, supported by
abundant case law, and cogent reasoning, the Government
will have little chance of convincing a court that the
principles articulated by the Supreme Court in the Greene
case [concerning rights of confrontation and cross-
examination] do not or should not apply to security
clearance cases under a new system or Executive Order.
[Ref. 31:p. 173]
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8. Personal Values of Adjudicators
Every individual has his or her own personal sense of
"right and wrong." Such personal, or moral, values have been
pinpointed by some as a major reason for subjectivity in
adjudicative decisions:
[Appraisers] may overlook past activities if they are
similar to activities they or their acquaintances were
once involved with. Or if past activities offend an
appraiser's personal moral values, the appraiser may take
a particularly harsh stance regardless of what these
actions really indicate about the applicant's probable
future behavior. [Ref. 25:p. 51]
In addition, most individuals, including adjudicators, could
probably describe themselves as "liberal," "conservative,"
"moderate," or some variant thereof in their general
orientation. While such attitudes and values may affect
clearance adjudication to some unknown extent, skilled
adjudicators who are aware of their existence can work to
minimize their effect. The administrative judge is a variable
studied in this thesis.
9. Environmental Factors
One final factor which could affect the adjudication
of security clearances is the influence of so-called
"environmental factors", a term used to refer to such items as
prevailing public opinion and agency philosophy. For example,
in the midst of outcries from governmental committees that the
DOD clearance denial rate of about 1 percent was too low [Ref.
2:p. 36; ll:p. 4; and 18:p. 7], adjudicators may have felt
inclined to deny more clearances. In addition, as is true for
31
most agencies, departmental philosophy may change from time to
time perhaps influenced by the liberal or conservative
attitudes of departmental personnel or managers. These
attitudes, may, in turn, exert some unmeasured influence on
adjudication. Finally, in an era of increasing budgetary
constraints, pressure often mounts to do more with less. The
resulting increase in individual caseloads may encourage an
emphasis on the number rather than quality of cases
adjudicated [Ref. 33:p. 19]. Adjudicators should be aware of
the presence of such influences so as to minimize their
potential impact on adjudicative decisions.
E. FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY RISK
This section examines the financial aspects of security
risk by exploring the motives involved in the commission of
both white collar crime and espionage. Knowledge of such
motives has lead to an increased emphasis on government access
to personal financial information, which will be discussed
last
.
1. Motives in White Collar Crime
One definition of "white collar" crime, a term coined
more than 40 years ago by criminologist Edwin Sutherland [Ref.
34 :p. 109], is "committing a premeditated illegal act against
the institution where the individual is employed," with the
term "institution" applying to both the government and the
private sector [Ref. 35:p. 486]. While some believe that "the
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biggest group of offenders are persons heavily in debt," [Ref.
35 :p. 486] research indicates that persons commit crimes
against their employers for many reasons.
For example, two groups--100 certified public
accountants and 90 participants at a security conference—were
independently asked to rank reasons why employees steal or
embezzle from their employers. The top four reasons were the
same for both groups. (1) They can get away with it, (2)
stealing a little from a big company won't hurt, (3) each
thief has his or her own motives so there is no general rule,
and (4) fear of being caught is not a deterrent. In fact, the
motive that "they think they desperately need, want, or desire
the money or articles stolen" was ranked only 13th! [Ref.
36:pp. 112-113]
Other reasons cited in the literature for employee
crime include revenge against the company, peer pressure, the
challenge of beating the system, hatred of management, outside
pressures such as blackmail or extortion, a company's
reluctance to prosecute due to negative publicity, an
internally corrupt business environment where "stealing is a
way of life," alienation from the corporate bureaucracy, a
court system that "goes light" on white collar crime, and a
prevailing attitude in society and the business world that "it
isn't a crime if you don't get caught." [Ref. 37:pp. 93-94;
38:p. 26; and 39:p. 63]
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Many models , theories, and generalizations about crime
have been offered. For example, according to one article,
there are two general causes of workplace dishonesty--
individual predisposition and management indifference [Ref.
40 :p. 94]. Economic theories of crime, on the other hand,
regard "the criminal as a rational actor, maximizing profit
within a matrix of costs and opportunities." [Ref. 41:p. 1]
For example, in the Becker economic model, if the gain in
expected utility from engaging in an illegal activity is
positive, then a decision maker will choose to engage in the
activity [Ref. 41 :p. 3].
Yet another study identified the essential
preconditions of internal crime as need, opportunity, and
justification. An employee could "need" money, revenge, or
excitement; have the "opportunity" to commit the crime due to
poor internal controls, lack of punishment, or a clearance for
access; and "justify" the crime based on a corrupt corporate
environment, poor treatment by management, impersonality of
the corporation, or societal reinforcement ("everyone's doing
it" ) . [Ref. 42:pp. 14-15]
In fact, as one article pointed out, there is some
validity to the excuse "everyone does it— I'm only taking my
share." [Ref. 42] Seven out of ten employees can be expected
to steal at one time or another; one-half of corporate
executives see nothing wrong with bribing foreign officials;
and 60 percent of employee theft occurs at the
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executive/managerial level [Ref. 42:pp. 12-16]. According to
a study done by the Bureau of Justice, 75 percent of all
employees will steal at least once [Ref. 37:p. 93].
Recognition of the prevalence of white collar crime is
reflected in such statements as "the defense industry is rife
with corruption" [Ref 38 :p. 26] and "if you were going to
prosecute all the companies in America engaging in industrial
espionage, then you'd have to put most of the Fortune 500 in
jail." [Ref. 38:p. 28]
Regardless of the reasons why employees steal, some
suggested solutions to the problem have included the
following: (1) honesty testing [Ref. 43]; (2) a complete
prescreening sequence to include interviews, psychological
testing, and reference, credit, and criminal checks [Ref.
40 :p. 95]; (3) improvement of the corporate environment to
include a willingness to prosecute, better relations with
employees, and higher ethical standards [Ref. 38 :p. 28-31];
and (4) continuing observation of employees, including
periodic background investigations and identification of
employees who are disgruntled or living beyond their means
[Ref. 37:p. 94].
It should be apparent from the foregoing discussion
that employees commit crimes against their employers for many
reasons. In other words, financial crimes are not necessarily
committed solely because of financial need or greed.
Consequently, a "clean" credit check does not guarantee that
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an employee will not commit a financial crime. As will be
seen in the next section, however, the financial motive, while
not always controlling in the commission of white collar
crime, seems to figure much more prominently in espionage.
2. Financial Motive in Espionage
The following quotes reflect the strong influence of
the financial motive—including both need and greed--in the
commission of espionage:
The KGB itself has provided a clue to the types of people
in whom it is particularly interested. It uses an English
word to remind its officers of the appeals they should use
in their recruiting efforts. The acronym is vMICE'--for
Money, Ideology, Compromise, and i?go. [Ref. 44 :p. 8]
Money has become an increasingly important factor in U.S.
espionage cases during the last quarter century. In
virtually all recent spy incidents, Soviet agents have
paid substantial sums to the Americans who purloined
information for them. More than anything else, they have
been business deals with, in some instances, the American
making the original approach to the Soviets. Greed and
need have been the motivators. Nowadays officers and
agents of the KGB and GRU (Soviet military intelligence)
look for the government or contractor employee with access
who is a compulsive gambler or has other serious money
management problems. The contractor whose firm is having
financial problems also interests them. They can be very
generous if the information potentially available is "hot"
enough. [Ref. 44:p. 8]
Most of the Americans who were caught spying between 1984
and 1986 had no ideological commitment to another foreign
country. They sold U.S. secrets for financial reasons.
[Ref. 5:p. 6]
It is a sad fact that the preponderance of recent
espionage cases have hinged on the greed of Americans
willing to betray their country's secrets [Ref. 5:p. 15].
Stanislav Levchenko, the highest-ranking KGB officer to defect
to the U.S., in predicting increased Soviet efforts to obtain
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U.S. intelligence, commented, "For the price of one tank. . .you
can recruit a dozen people." [Ref. 45 :p. 7] Said William
Bell, who was convicted of espionage in 1981,
[Polish intelligence officer] Mr. Zacharski had found a
fool that needed money. I had a weak spot. He took
advantage of me. [Ref. 10:p. 228]
In the case of James Harper, who was convicted of espionage
in 1984,
It appeared that the Poles were not as interested in the
classified Defense documents from SCI as he had originally
thought, so, upon his return to California, he buried them
in an out-of-the-way location in the San Joaquin River
delta near Stockton
—
just for safe-keeping in case a buyer
could later be found. [Ref. 10:p. 210]
Of 59 cases of espionage compiled by the Department of
Defense Security Institute from the last 15 years, 41 of them
--almost 70 percent--involved the successful or attempted
exchange of money. Thirty-one cases involved cleared US
citizens selling documents for money; 10 cases involved
foreign agents paying US undercover agents for documents.
[Ref. 46]
Evidence indicates that the trend toward "spying for
profit" will continue. Frank Nesbitt, former Air Force and
Marine official, was indicted in 1989 for attempting to sell
classified information to the Soviets [Ref. 45:p. 1]. Charles
Schoof and John Haeger, both former Navy petty officers, were
convicted in 1990 of attempting to sell classified information
to the Soviets [Ref. 47 :p. 1]. Clyde Conrad, former army
sergeant, was sentenced to life in prison for selling material
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to the Hungarian and Czechoslovak secret services [Ref. 48 :p.
1]. Roderick Ramsay, another former army sergeant who worked
for Conrad, was indicted for selling secret NATO plans to the
Soviet Union [Ref. 48:p. 2].
While additional research is clearly needed to better
predict who might commit espionage, one researcher observed
that there are not enough cases of espionage from which to
draw statistically significant conclusions as to who will or
will not commit espionage [Ref. 49 :p. 4]. Also, studies must
be planned to include financial information. For example, the
author of one study of background investigation data admitted
that one major limitation was the undersampling of financial
credit data [Ref. 50:p. 969]. While more studies are being
conducted, the US government's more immediate response to the
increasing incidence of espionage is to increase access to the
financial records of employees applying for and currently
holding security clearances.
3. Increased Access to Financial Information
As the financial motives of spies became increasingly
apparent, efforts were initiated to increase access to
financial information during the security clearance process
through several means, some of which were discussed
previously. (1) There should be increased emphasis on
periodic reinvestigations, since in "recent espionage cases
(e.g., Chin, John Walker), the employees who engaged in
espionage were never subjects of reinvestigation." [Ref. 5:p.
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16] (2) Investigations for secret clearances should be
expanded to include credit checks. (3) There is a need for
new legislation, such as the proposed Counterintelligence
Improvements Act of 1990 , which would require that persons who
receive top secret clearances permit the government access to
their financial records anytime during the period the
clearance is held and for five years thereafter [Ref. 7:pp. 2,
10].
The following quote represents a viewpoint held by
more and more persons concerning the importance of financial
information in the clearance process:
The Committee [on Intelligence] believes strongly that
financial information deserves a more important focus in
background investigations. Background investigations and
reinvestigations are critically incomplete—and security
decisions based on them are equally f lawed--absent
essential financial information. Failure to consider such
information in security investigations is a serious
security flaw. [Ref 5:p.l5]
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III. BACKGROUND
This chapter examines the official directives and
guidelines governing the clearance process and outlines the
major steps in the DISCR adjudication process.
A. OFFICIAL DIRECTIVES AND GUIDELINES
Each of the following documents is discussed in turn: (1)
DOD Directive 5220.6, "Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program" [Ref. 1]; (2) DIS 20-1-M, "Defense
Investigative Service Manual for Personnel Security
Investigations" [Ref. 23]; and (3) Executive Order 10865,
"Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry" [Ref.
32] .
1. DOD Directive 5220.6
While DOD Regulation 5200. 2-R, "DOD Personnel Security
Program" [Ref. 51], is the basic personnel security regulation
for all DOD components, DOD Directive 5220.6 is the
implementing instruction for the adjudication of industrial
clearances at DISCR [Ref. 1]. Both list the main categories
of criteria to be considered in adjudicating cases. These
categories are listed in Appendix D. It should be noted that
a different letter has been designated for each type of
criterion. A case containing derogatory information in a
certain criterion is labelled with the letter corresponding to
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that criterion. As previously noted, a case involving an
excessive amount of debt is labelled with the letter "L." A
case may be labelled with as many letters as apply, usually no
more than five or six in practice. [Ref. l:pp. 5-7]
The most current DOD Instruction 5220.6, dated 12
August 1985, introduced three major changes in adjudication
procedure at DISCR. First, it revised the definition of
financial criterion "L" to delete the phrase "repetitive
unexplained absences from places of employment or official
duty." The current definition is "excessive indebtedness,
recurring financial difficulties, or unexplained affluence."
Consequently, cases involving unexplained absences from work
or duty were no longer adjudicated under criterion "I unless
financial indications were present. [Ref. 1]
Second, the instruction established new adjudication
policy which must be considered by adjudicators in determining
the degree of financial irresponsibility displayed by
applicants. The new policy is reproduced in Appendix E.
Other criteria, such as drug or alcohol abuse, mental illness,
and criminal behavior, have their own adjudication policy.
Some criteria, such as "I" for irresponsibility, have no
corresponding adjudication policy. However, the directive
requires that the following general factors be considered in
all determinations:
1. The nature and seriousness of the conduct;
2. The circumstances surrounding the conduct;
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3. The frequency and recency of the conduct;
4. The age of the individual;
5. The motivation of the individual, or the extent to
which the conduct was negligent, willful, or
voluntary;
6. The absence or presence of positive evidence of
rehabilitation; and
7. The probability that the conduct will or will not
continue or recur in the future. [Ref. l:p. 5]
Third, the new instruction altered the role of appeal
boards in case adjudication. Prior to 12 August 1985, appeal
board determinations, whether affirming or reversing the
determinations of administrative judges, were final. Cases
were remanded (returned) to administrative judges only when
appeal boards directed that additional testimony or evidence
be admitted into the record for consideration or further
investigation be conducted on the case. Under the new DOD
Directive, however, appeal boards may only affirm or remand,
but not reverse, the determinations of administrative judges.
In other words, if an appeal board disagrees with a given
determination, it must remand the case to the administrative
judge for a "determination pursuant to remand." [Ref. l:Encl
(1)]
The main emphases in adjudication as outlined in the
directive include the following: (1) Clearances may be granted
only when "clearly consistent with the national interest" to
do so, and (2) "each personnel determination must be a fair
and impartial overall commonsense decision based upon a
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consideration of all available information, both favorable and
unfavorable." [Ref. l:p. 5]
2. DIS Manual 20-1-M
DIS 20-1-M outlines the requirements and guidelines to
be followed by DIS in performing PSIs of applicants for
clearances. Areas covered include (1) interview procedures;
(2) thresholds for determining "issue" cases, those cases
containing enough derogatory information to require or warrant
"expanded" investigations; and (3) investigative requirements,
the depth of which depends on the level of clearance requested
[Ref. 23]. For example, credit checks are required for top
secret, but not secret, access. Consequently, the likelihood
of finding derogatory financial information is greater for top
secret vice secret clearance applicants. This point explains
why the level of clearance requested is a variable in this
study
.
While the depth of investigations depends on the level
of access requested, it is interesting to note that cases are
not adjudicated on the basis of the level of clearance
requested. The final determination of Case OSD No. 83-1345,
issued 30 July 1984, concluded that neither the Appeal Board
nor the administrative judges had the power to issue so-called
"split" decisions, whereby an applicant was granted a security
clearance at but not above a certain classification level.
Consequently, cases adjudicated thereafter make no distinction
as to the level of classified information to which the
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applicant has access and simply grant the applicant a security
clearance, the level of which is determined by that requested
by the employer.
3. Executive Order 10865
This executive order, promulgated by President
Eisenhower in 1960 and revised periodically thereafter,
requires due process for industrial clearance applicants, to
include the following: (1) written reasons for denial, (2) a
chance to reply in writing to the reasons, (3) the right to a
hearing, (4) reasonable time to prepare for the hearing, (5)
the right to be represented by counsel, (6) an opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses, and (7) written notice of the final
decision [Ref. 32]. As will be seen in the next section, the
DISCR adjudication process incorporates all these elements so
as to afford industrial applicants due process.
B. THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS
Exhibit 1 shows the organizational relationships among the
four main agencies—DIS, DISCO, DISCR, and PIC--involved in
the DOD industrial security clearance process. Exhibit 2,
adapted from Appendix C in reference 31, shows the sequence of
major steps in the DOD industrial security clearance process,
highlighting the DISCR adjudication process. Each step will
be explained below.
Step 1 - Request for Clearance. A company security officer
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(Note: Applicant may appeal an
unfavorable decision resulting
from appeal by department counsel)
Exhibit 2.
DOD Industrial Security Clearance Process
(adapted from Appendix C in Reference 31)
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responsible for processing and issuing all industrial security
clearances, a request for investigation on behalf of an
employee needing a clearance. Included is the personnel
security questionnaire (PSQ), which is filled out by the
employee and covers such areas as present and former
residences and places of employment, education, and credit
references. The level of clearance requested is also noted on
the request for investigation, thereby determining, as
explained earlier, the depth of investigation performed.
Step 2 - PIC Initiates the Investigation. DISCO will
forward the PSQ to PIC in Baltimore, MD, which will then
initiate a PSI, investigating the applicant's background in
accordance with the level of clearance requested. "Scoping"
is the term used at PIC to refer to assessing the level of
investigative effort required. Through scoping, case
controllers identify "issue" cases, those cases exceeding
established thresholds or containing enough derogatory
information, in the case controller's judgment, to warrant
further investigation.
Step 2A - DIS Conducts the Investigation. The
investigative leads and requirements are submitted to Special
Agents in the field. In addition, a National Agency Check is
conducted by PIC personnel.
Step 3 - Nature of Investigative Results. If the
investigative results are favorable, then DISCO will issue a
letter of consent (LOC) approving the issuance of the
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clearance. If the investigative results are unfavorable, then
the case is forwarded to DISCR for adjudication.
Step 4 - DISCR Evaluates Questionable Cases. First,
adjudicators called personnel security specialists at one of
DISCR' s two personnel security divisions (PSD) in Columbus,
OH, will examine the case. If they grant the clearance, they
will notify DISCO to issue the clearance. If they cannot
grant the clearance, then the case is forwarded to personnel
security specialists at DISCR's PSD in Arlington, VA. If the
clearance still cannot be granted, then a statement of reasons
(SOR) explaining why the clearance cannot be granted is
forwarded to the applicant.
Step 5 - Applicant Response to SOR. An applicant who is
denied a clearance and wishes to contest it must submit within
20 days of receipt of the SOR a written answer under oath
(notarized) admitting or denying each allegation in the SOR.
If no response is received within 20 days of issuance of the
SOR, then the decision to revoke or deny the clearance is
final. If a response is received within 20 days, then another
type of DISCR adjudicator, called an administrative judge,
will rule on the case.
Step 6 - Administrative Judge Convenes a Hearing. The
applicant may request to appear at a hearing, with or without
an attorney or personal representative. The applicant may
also cross-examine witnesses. Alternatively, the applicant
may waive the hearing and request that the administrative
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judge issue an "administrative determination." In either
case, "department counsel," or staff attorneys at DISCR,
represent DOD. The administrative judge's decision, whether
favorable or unfavorable, is final if not appealed by either
party. Otherwise, the case is reviewed again.
Step 7 - Response to Administrative Judge's Determination.
The applicant or department counsel may file a notice to
appeal the case within 20 days from issuance of the
administrative judge's determination (the actual appeal itself
may be submitted within 60 days from issuance of the
determination). Either party appealing must state in writing
the issues in question. No new evidence or testimony is
considered on appeal. If the appeal board--a panel of DISCR
staff attorneys designated to rule in cases that are appealed
--affirms the administrative judge's decision, then the
determination, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
applicant, is final. If the appeal board disagrees with the
administrative judge's decision—due to either error in
procedure or the "arbitrary or capricious" nature of the
ruling—then it must "remand" (return) the case to the
administrative judge for review. The administrative judge
will either affirm or reverse his or her initial decision. If
an initially favorable decision is reversed by the
administrative judge unfavorably for the applicant upon appeal
by government counsel, then the applicant may appeal it (see
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dotted line in Exhibit 2). A given case may be appealed or




Eleven "Index to Cases" volumes, listing all cases
adjudicated by DISCR administrative judges from 4 July 1967
through 31 December 1989, were obtained from DISCR. The
indexes include the following information for each case: (1)
an identifying case number, (2) letters of criteria or issues
involved in the case (e.g., "L" for financial, "M" for alcohol
abuse), (3) the date of determination, and (4) a brief
synopsis of the case. A list was compiled of all cases in the
eleven volumes encoded with an "L" for "excessive
indebtedness, recurring financial difficulties, or unexplained
affluence," [Ref. l:p. 7] whether or not other issues were
indicated. There were a total of 368 such cases involving
financial issues. It should be noted, however, that many of
the 368 cases on the list also involved nonfinancial issues.
The redacted versions of the 368 case summaries were then
retrieved and photocopied at DISCR in Arlington, VA. Table I
shows the breakdown of the 368 financial cases by volume and
year under the heading "All Financial."
To help isolate financial criteria used in adjudicating
the cases, cases involving nonfinancial issues were excluded
from this study. One exception involved the criterion "I" for




BREAKDOWN OF FINANCIAL CASES BY INDEX VOLUME AND YEAR
Type of Financial Case
Index All All L, LI Chosen
Volume Year Financial L, LI for Study
I 1967 - :1975 61 33
II 1976 - :L982 25 16
III 1983 - :1984 29 22
IV 1985 14 8
V 1986 11 3
VI 1986 24 13 13
VII 1987 2
VIII 1987 29 17 17
IX 1988
X 1989 94 39 39
XI 1989 79 26 26
Totals 368 177 95
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[Ref . l:p. 6] Since most adjudicators considered the presence
of financial difficulty indicative of unreliability or
untrustworthiness , nearly all financial cases were encoded "I"
in addition to "L." Consequently, to obtain a meaningful
population size, cases encoded "LI" were included for study
along with "L" cases. Of the 368 financial cases, 177 were
encoded "L" or "LI." Table I shows the distribution of these
177 cases by volume and year under the heading "All L, LI."
One final restriction was imposed to obtain the group of
financial cases ultimately examined in this study. Due to
major changes in adjudicative policy and procedure introduced
by DOD Directive 5220.6 dated 12 August 1985 [Ref. 1], only
those "L" and "LI" cases adjudicated under the new directive
were used. In other words, only those 95 cases encoded "L" or
LI" in DISCR "Index to Cases" volumes VI, VIII, X, and XI
—
adjudicated in 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989 respectively—were
chosen for study. Aside from producing a manageable
population size, several advantages resulted from the
foregoing restriction. First, price level adjustments were
considered unnecessary, due to the recency of the cases. (The
total increase in the Consumer Price Index-Urban from 1985
through 1989 was 14.5 percent.) [Ref. 52 :p. 1] Second,
complications presented by cases involving "split" decisions
were avoided. For most cases adjudicated prior to 1985,
clearances were granted by classification level (e.g.,
confidential, secret). In contrast, for cases adjudicated
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after 1984, the classification level of the clearance was that
requested by the employer. Consequently, all 95 cases
included for study were adjudicated under the same guidelines,
thereby enhancing case comparability.
Table I shows the distribution of the 95 financial cases
chosen for study by volume and year. Cases which commenced
adjudication during 1988 or 1989 and for which final
determinations were available in 1990 were included for study.
Three cases had to be excluded because their adjudications
were still in progress and final determinations were
unavailable. The final group of 92 cases studied comprised 97
percent of the 95 cases in the population chosen for study, 52
percent of the 177 "L" and "LI" cases adjudicated between 1967
and 1989, and 25 percent of all financial cases adjudicated
between 1967 and 1989, including those also involving
nonfinancial issues. Obviously, the 92 cases chosen for study
are a major percentage of, and should therefore provide useful
insight into, all financial cases.
Finally, in order to obtain some measurement of index
accuracy of coded criteria, a computer-generated random sample
of cases was obtained equal to about 4 percent of the cases in
each of the above volumes. The redacted versions of these




As previously noted, the purpose of this study is to
determine empirically which financial factors are related to
adjudicative outcome. Consequently, the approach was to
analyze all of the financial data reported in the case
summaries. This approach resulted in the following ten major
financial data elements and their subelements:
1. Indebtedness
a. Length of time outstanding
b. Degree of applicant control over indebtedness
c. Total number of debts
d. Total dollar amount of debts
2. Insufficient Funds (NSF) Checks
a. Recency of occurrence
b. Total number of NSF checks




a. Recency of occurrence
b. Number of personal vice business bankruptcies
c. Number of personal reorganizations (chapter 13 of
the federal bankruptcy code) vice personal
discharge of debt (chapter 7 of the federal
bankruptcy code) bankruptcies
d. Total number of bankruptcies
e. Degree of applicant control over bankruptcies
f. Number of debts incurred since last bankruptcy
g. Amount of debt incurred since last bankruptcy
4. Judgments, Repossessions and Liens
a. Number of repossessions
b. Number of foreclosures
c. Number of judgments
d. Number of liens
e. Number of garnishments
f. Total number of the items in 4(a) through 4(e)
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5. Financial Frauds
a. Total number of frauds (i.e., forged checks,
welfare frauds, embezzlement)
6. Applicant attitude/intent to pay
a. Attitude displayed by applicant in person, or
indicated in writing, towards his or her debt and
stated intent to pay
7. Applicant payment efforts
a. Applicant began to pay debts only after receipt
of SOR
b. Evidence of rehabilitation, such as contacting
creditors, setting up and adhering to payment
plans
c. Adherence to chapter 13 bankruptcy payment plan
8. Applicant income/expenses
a. Relationship of monthly expenses to monthly
income (equal, less, greater)
b. Dollar amount of difference between monthly
expenses and monthly income
9. Tax Filings
a. Number of federal tax non-filings (i.e., failure
to file federal tax returns)
b. Number of state tax non-filings (i.e., failure to
file state tax returns)
c. Total number of federal and state tax non-filings
10. Typt; Debt
a. Percent of total amount of debt due to each of
the following eight areas: consumer, housing,
education, medical, utility, business, child
support /alimony , tax
b. Percent of total number of debts due to each of
the eight areas in 10(a)
In addition to the aforementioned financial items, the
following elements were included for analysis for the reasons
cited next to each:
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1. Applicant age: Immaturity due to youthful age was
sometimes a mitigating factor.
2. Administrative Every person has his or her own
judge: attitudes and perceptions
(Administrative judges are kept anonymous
in this study, however.)
3. Access level: Credit checks are routinely done for
top secret, but not confidential or
secret clearance applicants;
consequently, the probability of
finding derogatory financial
information is greater for top secret
applicants
.
4. Stability: Employment and character stability,
evidenced by length of employment and
letters of reference, are used by
administrative judges to help determine
general reliability and predict future
stability in financial matters.
5. Legal counsel: An applicant who retains an attorney
may be better able to present his or
her case for a favorable ruling.
6. Case outcome: The final outcome is needed to
determine the effects of all the
foregoing items on adjudicative
decisions.
All the foregoing items were identified and assigned
computer spaces and code names in a computer codebook, as
shown in Appendix A. All other items in the codebook were
included for informational purposes to help determine the
profile of the average applicant denied a clearance for
financial reasons. Note that the financial adjudicative
policy factors (listed in Appendix E) cited in each case by
the administrative judge in reaching his or her determination
were also encoded. The purpose for this was to link the
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financial items and thresholds with the policy factors
considered relevant.
C. DATA COLLECTION
The data elements identified above were encoded from each
case onto data input sheets, an example of which is shown in
Appendix F. The data were then stored on disk on an IBM
mainframe for later analysis. Most data elements were easily
found due to their numerical nature. In some cases, however,
the data were either not included or deleted along with other
identifying information when the cases were redacted.
Obviously, such information could not be entered into the
database
.
The SOR, which states the reasons for denial of clearance
and is attached to or incorporated within each case summary,
contained most of the pertinent financial information,
including types, amounts, and recency of delinquent debts and
bankruptcies. The body of the summary, however, sometimes
noted revisions (i.e., amendments, deletions, or adjustments)
to the SOR. Examples of revisions include the deletion of a
debt not actually owed by the applicant, a correcting
adjustment--either higher or lower—of a given debt amount,
and an amendment to the SOR to include another delinquent debt
owed by the applicant. Figures entered into the database
reflect such revisions.
Reductions in an applicant's account balances due to
payments made between the date of SOR issuance and the hearing
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date were, however, not incorporated into the figures entered
in the database. Such considerations as progress in making
payments and whether payments were made incident to issuance
of the SOR are data elements entered elsewhere in the
database. The goal was to reflect in the database figures as
nearly as possible the original financial situation causing
denial of clearance as outlined in the SOR, adjusted for any
errors or amendments thereto. Most SOR adjustments were
minor. The date of SOR issuance was used to calculate periods
of time, such as how long debts were outstanding and duration
of employment.
While most financial information contained in the case
summaries tended to be objective and numerical in nature,
other types of information considered by the administrative
judge in adjudicating the case were more subjective and tended
to reflect the judgment of the administrative judge. Examples
include whether or not mitigating circumstances were involved
in the incurrence of debt; whether or not the applicant
displayed an intent to honor his or her financial obligations;
and whether or not the applicant made significant efforts to
contact creditors and set up payment plans. Both objective
and subjective types of information were extracted from the
case summaries to the extent possible.
With regard to the random sample, a two step approach was
used to obtain the data needed to estimate index accuracy.
First, the criteria (e.g., "L, " "I," "N" ) assigned to each
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selected case in the corresponding index were recorded.
Second, the criteria actually addressed in each of these cases
were recorded. Data analysis is discussed next.




To assess the accuracy of the index case criteria
coding, each randomly selected case was examined to determine
whether its code in the index accurately reflected issues
involved in the case. Any discrepancies between the two were
noted. A case was considered to be coded incorrectly in the
index if too many, too few, or incorrect criteria were listed.
2. Financial Cases
This thesis was primarily conducted to identify those
financial factors and thresholds thereof that best distinguish
between applicants who are granted and those who are denied
clearances. Frequency distributions, t-tests, and measures of
association were all used to identify those financial factors
most significant in determining adjudicative outcome and to
determine their degree of statistical significance.
Frequency distributions were used to highlight those
factors most likely to distinguish between clearance approvals
and denials. For example, failure to contact creditors or
establish payment plans was involved in most cases in which
clearance was denied but occurred in few cases in which
clearance was granted. Consequently, the factor "systematic
efforts to satisfy creditors" was further investigated to
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determine more precisely its degree of significance as an
adjudicative factor.
T-tests were used to test hypotheses for numerical
factors. For example, the mean dollar amount of total
delinquent debt was computed for the following two groups:
(1) cases in which clearance was denied and (2) cases in which
clearance was granted. A t-test was then performed to
determine whether the difference between the two means was
significant enough to conclude that the dollar amount of total
delinquent debt was a major adjudicative factor in determining
case outcome, as opposed to have simply occurred by chance as
a result of the sample selected. T-tests were used for the
following three types of data: (1) ordinal (i.e., ranked
data), (2) interval (i.e., equally stepped data such as
temperature where each degree is an equal measure), and (3)
ratio (i.e., interval level data with an absolute zero
starting point such as age).
Measures of association were used to determine the
degree of correlation between each financial factor and case
outcome. The higher the measure of association, the greater
the likelihood that the particular financial factor influenced
case outcome. Measures of association used in this study
included phi (for 2x2 tables), Cramer's V and contingency
coefficient (for tables larger than 2 x 2), lambda (for
nominal level data), and biserial r (for data of a continuous
nature—ordinal, interval, or ratio).
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the results of analyzing both (1)
the random sample and (2) the financial cases chosen for
study.
A. RANDOM SAMPLE
The random sample was obtained in order to determine the
degree of index accuracy. A high degree of accuracy would
indicate that the indexes were reliable in providing the
desired population of financial cases. Table II shows the
number of errors and error rate for cases involving all types
of criteria in the random sample by volume and year. Table
III shows the number of errors and error rate for only
financial cases in the random sample by volume and year.
Several observations may be made concerning the statistics
presented in the tables. First, note in Table II the downward
trend in the coding error rate for all cases in the random
sample, from a high of over 30 percent in 1986 to less than
three percent in 1989. Such a rapid improvement in coding
accuracy is, indeed, impressive! Second, while Table III
shows a low overall coding error rate (less than three
percent) for all financial cases in the random sample, note
the exceptionally low overall coding error rate of less than
one percent for cases involving only criterion "L" or both "L"
and "I" (listed under the heading "L, LI Error Rate").
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TABLE II
INDEX CODING ERRORS (ALL TYPES) FOR RANDOM SAMPLE
Number Number
Volume Year of Cases of Errors Error Rate
VI 1986 23 7 30.4%
VIII 1987 36 4 11.1












INDEX CODING ERRORS (ONLY FINANCIAL) FOR RANDOM SAMPLE
Number Number





XI 1989 36 0.0 0.0
















This latter finding is significant because only "L" and "LI"
cases were chosen for study in this thesis. Such a low coding
error rate provides high assurance that (1) the indexes were
reliable in providing the desired "L" and "LI" cases and (2)
the results of this study may be taken to fairly represent the
chosen "L" and "LI" financial case population.
B. FINANCIAL CASES
This section presents the results of analyzing the "L" and
"LI" financial cases chosen for study in two subsections: (1)
major financial factors and (2) significant financial
thresholds
.
1. Major Financial Factors
Ten financial factors correlated very highly with case
outcome. These factors are listed in Table IV by their
abbreviated codebook names, along with their full names and
brief descriptions of their meanings. Table V shows only a
representative sample of the high correlation values these
factors produced, since each factor scored very high on every
measure of association used in this study. The low p-values,
mostly below .001, provide a further indication that the
factors are, indeed, correlated with case outcome. As noted
at the bottom of Table V, a factor with an absolute
correlation value between .35 and .65, which applies to most
factors in the table, has limited ability to predict case
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Applicant did or did not
contact creditors and
adhere to payment plans
Applicant did or did not
produce proof of his or
her character
Cause of indebtedness







CORRELATION VALUES FOR THE TEN MAJOR FINANCIAL FACTORS
Financial Biserial 1 ' 3 Cramer's V2 3
Factor (p-value) (p-value)
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1 Value is between and 1 if financial factor is positively
related to case outcome (presence of factor influences
approval of clearance) or between and -1 if negatively
related (presence of factor influences denial of clearance).
Value ranges from to 1
.
degree, but not the type
association.
A large value indicates a high
(positive or negative) , of
3 Absolute values between approximately .35 and .65 indicate
factor has limited predictive value used singly, but can yield
useful predictive value when combined with other factors of
similar or higher value [Ref. 54 :p. 624].
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outcome by itself, but can be very predictive when combined
with other factors of similar or higher value [Ref. 54 :p.
624]. The adjudication policy factors referred to in both
Tables IV and V, and outlined in their entirety in Appendix E
of this thesis, are those which must be considered by
adjudicators in determining the applicant's degree of
financial responsibility [Ref l:p. 7].
As a matter of comparison, the next six financial
factors most highly correlated with case outcome had absolute
correlation values mostly between .20 and .35, and p-values
above .02. Correlations at this level are considered of
limited value in many practical prediction situations [Ref.
54 :p. 624]. The remaining 37 factors had correlation values
mainly below .20 and p-values above .06. Correlations at this
level are considered by some to be of very limited or no value
in most prediction settings [Ref. 54 :p. 624].
A cross correlation matrix depicting the extent to
which the variables presented in Table V are intercorrelated
with each other is presented in Table VI. The total number of
factors supporting granting a clearance (TOTFACTS) was highly
correlated with adjudication policy factors 1, 2, and 3
supporting granting a clearance ( FACTS 1, FACTS2, AND FACTS3,
respectively). The adjudication factor reflecting that the
applicant had a stable employment record and favorable
references (FACTS3) was highly correlated with the variable
















































REHAB REFS CONDET WHYDET
FACTS
1
.2940 .0000 .1742 .0161
n=84 n=32 n=81 n=82
P=.003 P=.500 P=.060 P=.443
FACTS2 .2189 .3228 .2897 .2461
n=84 n=84 n=81 n=82
P=.023 P=.036 P=.004 P=.013
FACTS
3
.1994 .7091 .3686 .3088
n=84 n=32 n=81 n=82
P=.034 P=.000 P=.000 P=.002
FACTA7 -.3876 -.1273 -.2780 -.2281
n=84 n=32 n=81 n=82
P=.000 P=.244 P=.006 P=.020
TOTFACTS .2885 .3038 .4213 .1718
n=90 n=34 n=87 n=88
P=.003 P=.040 P=.000 P=.055
TOTFACTA -.3192 -.1450 -.2809 -.2320
n=90 n=34 n=87 n=88
P=.001 P=.207 P=.004 P=.015












* coefficient/number of cases/1-tailed significance level
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or her character (REFS). In addition, the variable reflecting
whether or not the cause of the applicant's indebtedness was
within that person's control (CONDET) was highly correlated
with the cause of the applicant's indebtedness (WHYDET)
.
Given the overlapping nature of these variables, the
aforementioned high correlations are not surprising.
Table VII summarizes the type of relationship that
exists between each of the ten major financial factors and
case outcome. Also included are amplifying comments which use
percentages to quantify each relationship. The actual
relationships reflect those which would be intuitively
expected.
In order to further highlight the main financial
influences on case adjudication, Table VIII shows how the ten
major factors were grouped into the following four main
categories: (1) effort (applicant attitude toward, and efforts
made to resolve, his or her debt), (2) cause (degree to which
the cause of debt was within the control of the applicant),
(3) general (number of general adjudication policy factors
applied to the case by the administrative judge), and (4)
stability (evidence of a stable employment record and
favorable character references). Note in Table VIII that
financial factor FACTA7 (indifference of applicant toward his
or her debt) was grouped into Category 1 (effort in resolving
debt), because applicants who are indifferent toward their
debt are unlikely to take steps to resolve it. In other
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TABLE VII
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEN FINANCIAL FACTORS AND CASE OUTCOME
Factor Relationship with Case Outome
FACTS 1 Clearance approval more likely
if applicant made systematic
efforts to satisfy creditors.
FACTS2 Clearance approval more likely
if applicant showed favorable
change in financial habits.
FACTS3 Clearance approval more likely
if applicant had stable
employment/favorable references
FACTA7 Clearance denial more likely
if applicant was indifferent
to financial obligations.
TOTFACTS Clearance approval more likely
as total number of policy
factors supporting clearance
applicable to case increased
(maximum value TOTFACTS =5).
TOTFACTA Clearance denial more likely
as total number of policy
factors against clearance
applicable to case increased




























Clearance approval more likely 92% of rehabili-
if applicant contacted creditors tated applicants
and adhered to payment plans. approved.
Clearance approval more likely
if applicant produced reference
letters or character witnesses.
Clearance approval more likely
if indebtedness due to factors
beyond applicant's control.
Clearance approval more likely
for certain types of mitigating














GROUPING OF TEN FINANCIAL FACTORS INTO FOUR MAJOR CATEGORIES
Category
Category Description Financial Factor
1. Effort Efforts made 1. FACTS1 (systematic efforts
by applicant to satisfy creditors)
to resolve
debt. 2. FACTS2 (favorable change in
financial habits)
3. FACTA7 (indifference of
applicant toward his
or her debt)
4. REHAB (contacted creditors/
adhered to pay plans)







1. CONDET (control applicant had
over indebtedness)
2. WHYDET (mitigating cause for
debt, if applicable)







applied to 2. TOTFACTA (total number of
case by factors against
administrative clearance)
judge


















words, an applicant may seem concerned about his or her debt,
but still not do anything about it.
The outstanding feature one observes in examining the
ten major financial factors and four main categories in Table
VIII is their non-numerical nature. In other words, no
factors involve only numerical financial data, such as number
or dollar amount of debts, number of bankruptcies, and the
like. The two factors, TOTFACTA and TOTFACTS , in Category 3
involve such numerical financial data only to the extent their
consideration by administrative judges is required by the
financial adjudication policy outlined in reference 1 and
Appendix E. Specific policy factors involving numerical
financial data were not highly correlated with case outcome
and so were not individually represented in the list of top
ten financial factors or their four major categories. An
example of such a factor was FACTA5 , "unfavorable judgments,
liens, or repossessions." As will be seen in the next
section, however, some important numerical thresholds were
observed which helped to distinguish between cases in which
clearance was approved and denied.
2. Significant Financial Thresholds
As previously mentioned, none of the major factors
highly correlated with case outcome were numerical in nature.
There were, however, several significant financial thresholds
observed in this study. First, all six applicants with 13 or
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more delinquent debts were denied clearances. The six
applicants—of whom two had 14 debts, three had 21 debts, and
one had 25 debts--represented 14 percent of the 43 applicants
denied clearances and almost seven percent of all 92
applicants. Note that it does not apply in the reverse that
all applicants with less than 13 debts were approved for
clearance.
Second, nine out of ten applicants with less than
$1879 of debt were granted clearances. The nine applicants
represented over 18 percent of the 49 applicants granted
clearances and almost ten percent of all 92 applicants. In
other words, almost no applicant with less than $1879 of debt
was denied a clearance . The only exception was one applicant
denied a clearance who had no debt, but four bankruptcies.
The high number of bankruptcies, all of which were personal,
was most likely controlling in the decision due to its extreme
nature, since no other applicant in the entire group of 92 had
more than two bankruptcies.
Third, the two applicants with only business
bankruptcies were both approved for clearance. One applicant
had one business bankruptcy; the other had two. Of course,
the small number of applicants involved makes it hard to
generalize. However, this finding, when considered with the
finding in Table VII that clearance was approved in all six
cases involving business failure as a mitigating circumstance,
suggests that debt and bankruptcy, when due to business
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failure, are weighed less heavily against the applicant by
administrative judges when adjudicating cases.
Finally, the rather striking homogeneity of the two
groups of applicants (those granted clearances in one group
and those denied clearances in the other) in terms of age and
sex is worthy of note. The average ages of applicants who
were approved for clearance and those who were denied were
38.6 and 38.5 years, respectively. The percentages of men who
were approved for clearance and those who were denied were
75.5 and 74.4, respectively. The percentages of women who
were approved for clearance and those who were denied were
24.5 and 25.6, respectively. Obviously, an applicant's age
and sex had little influence on case outcome.
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VI . SUMMARY
This chapter presents answers to the research questions,
conclusions of the study, recommendations, and areas for
further research.
A. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This section will provide answers to the research
questions posed by this thesis in chapter 1. The depth and
extent of answers will necessarily be limited by the results
obtained from the study. Each question will be restated and
then answered.
1. What financial criteria are used by DISCR in granting
or denying security clearances to industrial applicants? This
study identified ten major financial factors most highly
correlated with case outcome. The factors were then grouped
into four main categories. The four categories, with the
factors in each indicated in parentheses, are as follows: (1)
efforts by the applicant to resolve his or her debt (evidenced
by systematic efforts to satisfy creditors, a favorable change
in financial habits, the attitude of the applicant toward his
or her debt, and contacting creditors and adhering to payment
plans), (2) degree of control over the cause of debt by the
applicant (evidenced by whether the debt was caused by factors
within the applicant's control and presence of any mitigating
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circumstances), (3) number of applicable adjudication policy
factors applied to the case by the administrative judge
(evidenced by total number of factors supporting clearance and
total number of factors against clearance), and (4) employment
and character stability (evidenced by a stable employment
record and favorable character references).
2. Do the actual factors used differ from those outlined
in DOD Directive 5220.6 [Ref. 1 and Appendix E]? If yes, how?
Do the results of this study suggest the revision of current
adjudicative practice to conform to the guidelines or revision
of the guidelines themselves? This study indicates that
administrative judges apply all of the policy factors outlined
in DOD Directive 5220.6 in adjudication. For example, as
shown in Table IX, each of the ten financial factors
identified in this study as most highly correlated with case
outcome is represented by an identical or similar policy
factor in DOD Directive 5220.6. The existence of such a one-
to-one correspondence is not surprising, since many of the
factors in this study were based on policy factors in the
directive. Note that the two factors, TOTFACTS and TOTFACTA,
together incorporate all of the policy factors outlined in the
DOD Directive. Also, the finding in this study that all
applicants with only business bankruptcies or whose debt was
due to business failure were granted clearances suggests the
application of Mitigating Factor 5, "business-related
bankruptcy," in case adjudication by administrative judges.
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TABLE IX
TEN MAIN FINANCIAL FACTORS AND THEIR
CORRESPONDING POLICY FACTORS IN DOD DIRECTIVE 5220.6
Financial Type Corresponding Policy
Factor Factor Factor in Directive
Type
Factor
1. FACTS 1 Non- 1. Mitigating Factor 1 Non-
numerical numerical
(systematic efforts to satisfy creditors)
2. FACTS2 Non- 2. Mitigating Factor 2 Non-
numerical numerical
(favorable change in financial habits
3. FACTS3 Non- 3. Mitigating Factor 3 Non-
numerical numerical
(stable employment record and favorable references)




(applicant's indifference toward financial obligations
5. REHAB Non- 5. Mitigating Factor 1 Non-
numerical numerical
(contacted creditors/
adhered to pay plans
(systematic efforts
to satisfy creditors
6. CONDET Non- 6. Mitigating Factor 4 Non-
numerical numerical
(debt caused by circumstances beyond applicant's control)









TEN MAIN FINANCIAL FACTORS AND THEIR
CORRESPONDING POLICY FACTORS IN DOD DIRECTIVE 5220.6
Financial Type Corresponding Policy




















Mitigating Factor 1 Non-
( applicant made efforts) numerical
Mitigating Factor 2 Non-
( favorable habit changes) numerical
Mitigating Factor 3 Non-
stable job/character) numerical
Mitigating Factor 4 Non-
( cause beyond control) numerical
Mitigating Factor 5 Numerical
(business bankruptcy)
Negative Factor 1 Numerical
(history of bad debts)
Negative Factor 2 Numerical
(debt after bankruptcy)
Negative Factor 3 Non-
(cause within control) numerical
Negative Factor 4 Numerical
(history of NSF checks)
Negative Factor 5 Numerical
(judgments, liens, repos)
Negative Factor 6 Numerical
(deceit, embezzlement)
Negative Factor 7 Non-
( applicant indifference) numerical
Negative Factor 8 Numerical
(expenses exceed income)
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As indicated in Table IX, however, most factors are non-
numerical in nature (e.g., do not involve amounts of debt,
numbers of debts or repossessions, etc.). The results of this
study do not indicate why numerical factors are not highly
correlated with case outcome nor what action, if any, should
be taken to revise adjudicative practice and/or guidelines.
It is not surprising that the narrative, global statements
cited by the adjudicators as the primary reasons for clearance
outcome were generally more highly correlated with outcome
than specific numerical variables, especially given the skewed
distribution of many of these numerical variables. Further
research is needed to determine how administrative judges
apply numerical policy factors in adjudication and to what
degree numerical financial factors should be applied in
adjudication.
3. Do the results of this study suggest certain financial
issues which are unproductive in terms of their impact on
adjudicative outcomes? For example , are there financial
issues that, even under a worst case scenario, would not
result in adjudicators denying a clearance? This study
suggests several ways in which DIS investigators could more
effectively focus their research efforts. First, they might
wish to concentrate their attention more on those financial
areas most heavily weighted by DISCR administrative judges in
adjudication. Such areas would include the following four
financial categories identified in this study as most highly
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correlated with case outcome: efforts to resolve debt, cause
of debt, employment and character stability, and the general
financial policy factors outlined in DOD Directive 5220.6.
Second, investigators may wish to particularly focus their
research on non-numerical financial factors (e.g., the
applicant's attitude toward, efforts to resolve, and control
over the cause of his or her debt), which were weighted more
heavily by administrative judges in adjudication than
numerical financial factors (e.g., number of debts or
foreclosures, amount of debt).
4. Can the results of this study be used by DISCR to
improve the processing and adjudication of cases? DISCR
adjudicators should note that applicants whose debts or
bankruptcies were due solely to business failure, regardless
of the numbers or amounts involved, were generally approved
for clearances. In addition, all applicants with less than
$1870 of debt were approved for clearance, except for one who
had four personal bankruptcies. Adjudicators may wish to
approve such cases for clearance at a lower adjudicative level
so that they may concentrate their efforts instead on cases of
a more complicated nature with a less certain adjudicative
outcome
.
Another alternative would be to set the dollar threshold
for issue cases at $1000 or $1500. Cases involving a total
amount of debt less than the established threshold, with no
other complicating financial or nonfinancial issues, could
then be immediately approved for clearance by DISCO without
requiring any further investigation by DIS or adjudication by
DISCR. The investigative and adjudicative time and effort
saved could then be spent on other more demanding cases.
5. Can the database established as a result of this study
be further utilized to examine other relevant areas of
research , such as automated credit scoring? The database
established by this study could easily be used for other
research. For example, one could obtain information on the
criteria applied by credit agencies or lending institutions in
determining the creditworthiness of a given applicant. Such
criteria could then be applied to the database, and the
results compared with the case outcomes observed in this
study. It would be interesting to see how the private and
governmental sectors compare in determining credit risk and
security risk, respectively. In other words, one could
determine whether the federal government grants clearances to
applicants who would be denied credit in the private sector,
or vice versa, based on the same financial information. One
limitation of the database at this time is the absence of all
identifying case information (e.g., applicant name, address)
due to the use of redacted cases. Consequently, obtaining
credit and financial reports on the same 92 applicants used in
this study for purposes of further research would be
difficult. PIC may be able to provide some credit reports,
however, if furnished with some specific case information.
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B. CONCLUSIONS
The four main financial influences in case adjudication
were an applicant's (1) efforts to resolve his or her debt,
(2) degree of control over the cause of debt, (3) number of
applicable adjudication policy factors as outlined in DOD
Directive 5220.6 [Ref 1: encl (3)], and (4) employment and
character stability. The aforementioned four financial areas,
and the ten financial factors which comprise them, were mainly
non-numerical in nature (e.g., applicant effort or stability)
vice numerical (e.g., number or dollar amount of debt). In
other words, the underlying cause of debt and subsequent
handling thereof by the applicant were more influential than
the type, number or dollar amount of debt in determining case
outcome. Applicants whose debts were due to circumstances
beyond their control and who made good faith efforts to
resolve their debts were more likely to be granted clearances
than applicants whose debts were due to carelessness or
financial mismanagement and who made little or no attempt to
resolve their debts.
Applicants whose debt or bankruptcy was due to business
failure or whose total amount of debt was less than $1870 were
generally approved for clearance.
Adjudicators were found to determine case outcome in
accordance with established adjudication policy, as evidenced
by the fact that each of the financial factors most highly
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correlated with case outcome was represented by an identical
or similar policy factor listed in DOD Directive 5220.6.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following five recommendations are suggested on the
basis of the results of this study.
1. Set the dollar threshold for issue cases at $1000 or
$1500. Cases involving a total amount of debt less than the
established threshold, with no other complicating financial
matters, could then be immediately approved for clearance by
DISCO without requiring any further investigation by DIS or
adjudication at DISCR. Nine out of ten applicants with less
than $1870 of debt were granted clearances. The nine
applicants represented about ten percent of all 92 applicants
studied in this thesis. Consequently, adjudicative effort for
the 92 applicants could have been reduced by 10 percent if a
threshold of $1870 were applied at the time of their initial
processing. Seven of the nine approved applicants had total
debt of iKbb than $1000. Consequently, establishing an even
dollar threshold of $1000 or $1500 would have reduced
adjudicative effort by a still sizeable seven percent. The
one applicant with less than $1870 of debt who was denied a
clearance had four personal bankruptcies. Even with a higher
dollar threshold in place, such an applicant would most likely
have been further adjudicated as an issue case due to his more
complicated financial situation involving so many
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bankruptcies. For example, none of the other 91 applicants
had more than two bankruptcies of any kind.
2. Determine the extent to which adjudicators should
consider numerical factors in adjudication. This study found
that non-numerical factors (e.g., applicant attitude or
stability) were more highly correlated with case outcome than
numerical factors (e.g., amount or number of debts). Such a
finding suggests than numerical factors may not be weighted as
heavily or consistently as non-numerical factors in
adjudication. Adjudicative agencies may wish to consider
whether such a situation is or is not desirable and act
accordingly. For example, they may wish to revise current
adjudicative practice to emphasize the application of
numerical factors. Additionally or alternatively, they may
wish to revise current adjudicative guidelines by establishing
approximate thresholds for each of the numerical factors to
help clarify and improve consistency in their application.
3. Focus the research efforts of DIS investigators more
on those financial areas and factors most highly correlated
with case outcome. Adjudicators would likely be most
interested in receiving information on those financial areas
which they weight most heavily in case adjudication. Such
areas would be those found in this study to be most highly
correlated with case outcome. For example, DIS investigators
may wish to focus their research efforts on information
related to the four main financial influences on case outcome,
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which were the applicant's (1) efforts to resolve his or her
debt, (2) degree of control over the cause of debt, (3) number
of applicable financial adjudication policy factors as
outlined in DOD Directive 5220.6 [Ref. l:encl (3)], and (4)
employment and character stability. They may also wish to
particularly research whether debt or bankruptcy was due to
business failure, in which case most applicants were approved.
Providing such information most desired by administrative
judges would help speed the processing of cases with a minimum
of delays.
4. Encourage adjudicators to grant clearances at a lower
level in cases involving low amounts of debt or business
failure which would most likely be approved at a higher level.
This study has shown that applicants with a total amount of
debt less than $1870 or with debt or bankruptcy due to
business failure were generally approved for clearance. All
cases were adjudicated by a DISCR administrative judge after
first being adjudicated at several lower DISCR levels.
Approving such cases at lower levels, where possible, would
allow administrative judges and adjudicators at higher levels
to focus their efforts on those cases more deserving of
attention.
5. Clarify the non-numerical factors most highly
correlated with case outcome . Imprecision and personal
judgment are inherent in determining the degree of seriousness
of the non-numerical factors involved. For example, one
86
administrative judge may determine that employment was a
strong mitigating factor in a given case, while another
administrative judge may conclude that it was not. In this
study, of the fifteen cases citing unemployment as a
mitigating factor, eleven were approved for clearance and four
were not. Other financial issues may certainly have
influenced the final case outcomes. Yet, clarification of the
mitigating factor "unemployment" would surely help
adjudicators to apply the factor more consistently. For
example, is the mitigating factor "unemployment" weighted as
heavily for an applicant who is fired from or quits his or her
job as an applicant who is laid-off? How much effort must an
applicant be making to find a job to be considered bona fide
"unemployed" vice "temporarily out of the job market?"
Similarly, how many years must an applicant be employed at one
job to be considered "stable?" What are considered
"systematic" efforts to satisfy creditors? Answers to the
foregoing types of questions for the various non-numerical
factors would provide adjudicators helpful guidance in
adjudication.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
While this thesis identified ten financial factors highly
correlated with case outcome, additional research into the
nature of these factors could prove useful. Their non-
numerical nature makes imprecision and personal judgment
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inherent in their determination. For example, the attitude of
an applicant was a major financial factor in determining case
outcome. One might try to determine what criteria
administrative judges apply in discerning the attitude of a
given applicant. Similarly, the systematic efforts an
applicant made to satisfy creditors was also a major financial
factor in case outcome. One could try to determine what
actions by the applicant constitute "systematic" efforts to
resolve debt.
In addition, future cases could be analyzed using the
empirical approach in this study to determine the degree to
which the results are reproducible. Discriminant functions
could be developed in order to predict at a lower adjudicative
level the probable case outcome at a higher level.
One limitation of this study was that only financial
information contained in the redacted case summaries was
analyzed. Additional financial information could, however, be
obtained from each applicant's original credit reports filed
at PIC in order to determine the relationship between the
financial information contained therein and adjudicative
outcome. The results of such research could help verify or
refute the results of this study. The information contained
in the credit reports has the added advantages of being
objective and uniform for each case. Such additional
information could easily be added to the database established
from this study.
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Also, financial cases involving other issues, such as
psychological illness and drug abuse, were not included for
study. Such cases could be analyzed to determine how the
presence of these other issues affects adjudicative outcome
for financial cases. In addition, there are hundreds of cases
which do not involve financial issues at all. Many further
research studies are possible to determine the relationships
between these other issues, such as alcohol abuse and criminal
conduct, and adjudicative outcome. One could also examine the
time spent in each phase of the adjudicative process. This
type of information could help DISCR determine whether or not
to revise internal processing procedures or guidelines.
While this study analyzed only those cases adjudicated on
or after August 12, 1985, earlier cases could be analyzed to
determine how changes in adjudicative procedure as established
by the various DOD Directives 5220.6 affected adjudicative
outcome through time. The present study did not analyze any
cases that were not adjudicated by an administrative judge.
The analysis of such cases could also help to confirm or
refute the results of this study.
Finally, this study only examined industrial cases
adjudicated at DISCR. If there were a way to obtain
information on clearances adjudicated at the other CAFs for
civil service and military personnel, then studies could be
conducted comparing the financial criteria used to adjudicate







Part I. Case Identification
CASE OSD case no.
line 1
1-6 example: 810202 for 81-0202
VOLUME Volume number and year adjudicated
line 1
8-9 1 - Volume I - 1963-1975
2 - Volume II - 1976-1982
3 - Volume III - 1983-1984
4 - Volume IV - 1985
5 - Volume V - 1986
6 - Volume VI - 1986
7 - Volume VII - 1987
8 - Volume VIII- 1987
9 - Volume IX - 1988
10 - Volume X - 1988
11 - Volume XI - 1989
Part II. Adjudication Information
DOD Governing DoD Directive 5220.6
line 1
11 1 - DoD Directive 5220.6 dated December 7, 1966
2 - " April 4, 1975
3 - " December 20,1976
4 - " August 12, 1985
CRITA Criterion A: Sabotage, espionage, treason, etc.
line 1
13 1 - Criterion A not assigned to case
2 - Criterion A resolved in favor of applicant


























Criterion B: Association with saboteur, spy,
traitor.
1 - Criterion B not assigned to case
2 - Criterion B resolved in favor of applicant
3 - Criterion B resolved against applicant
Criterion C: Advocate/use force to overthrow U.S.
Government
.
1 - Criterion C not assigned to case
2 - Criterion C resolved in favor of applicant
3 - Criterion C resolved against applicant
Criterion D: Knowing membership in subversive
groups.
1 - Criterion D not assigned to case
2 - Criterion D resolved in favor of applicant
3 - Criterion D resolved against applicant
Criterion E: Unauthorized disclosure of classified
information.
1 - Criterion E not assigned to case
2 - Criterion E resolved in favor of applicant
3 - Criterion E resolved against applicant
Criterion F: Allegiance to a foreign government.
1 - Criterion F not assigned to case
2 - Criterion F resolved in favor of applicant
3 - Criterion F resolved against applicant
Criterion G: Violation of security regulations.
1 - Criterion G not assigned to case
2 - Criterion G resolved in favor of applicant
3 - Criterion G resolved against applicant
Criterion H: Criminal/sexually perverse acts.
1 - Criterion H not assigned to case
2 - Criterion H resolved in favor of applicant


























Criterion I: Acts of omission indicating poor
judgment.
1 - Criterion I not assigned to case
2 - Criterion I resolved in favor of applicant
3 - Criterion I resolved against applicant
Criterion J: Any illness causing impaired judgment
1 - Criterion J not assigned to case
2 - Criterion J resolved in favor of applicant
3 - Criterion J resolved against applicant
Criterion K: Vulnerability to coercion or
influence.
1 - Criterion K not assigned to case
2 - Criterion K resolved in favor of applicant
3 - Criterion K resolved against applicant
Criterion L: Excessive debt, financial
difficulties
.
1 - Criterion L not assigned to case
2 - Criterion L resolved in favor of applicant
3 - Criterion L resolved against applicant
Criterion M: Habitual use of intoxicants to excess
1 - Criterion M not assigned to case
2 - Criterion M resolved in favor of applicant
3 - Criterion M resolved against applicant
Criterion N: Illegal possession, use, or sale of
drugs
.
1 - Criterion N not assigned to case
2 - Criterion N resolved in favor of applicant
3 - Criterion N resolved against applicant
Criterion 0: Falsification/omission of material
facts
1 - Criterion not assigned to case
2 - Criterion resolved in favor of applicant
































Criterion P: Refusal to provide information to gov.
1 - Criterion P not assigned to case
2 - Criterion P resolved in favor of applicant
3 - Criterion P resolved against applicant
Number of criteria assigned
Code numeral from 1 through 9
SOR issue date
MM,DD,YY - month, day, last two digits of year
Date of applicant response to SOR
MM,DD,YY - month, day, last two digits of year
Hearing date (or date all documentation received
for an administrative determination)
MM,DD,YY - month, day, last two digits of year
Hearing determination date
MM,DD,YY - month, day, last two digits of year
Administrative Judge
each judge assigned unique two digit number
(names kept anonymous)
Applicant representation
1 - pro se (applicant representing self)
2 - represented by legal counsel/representative
3 - administrative determination (no hearing)
Hearing determination
1 - clearance granted (any kind)
2 - clearance granted (confidential)
3 - clearance granted (secret)
4 - clearance granted (top secret)








Note: Alternatives 2, 3, and 4 above apply mainly to cases
adjudicated before 1984, in which clearances were
granted authorizing access only up to a specified
level in so called "split decisions".
Appeal determination (first appeal)
1 - not applicable
2 - hearing determination affirmed
3 - hearing determination reversed
4 - order for remand to administrative judge
for redetermination
5 - appeal in process
NOTE: Alternative "3" above does not apply to cases
adjudicated under DoD Directive 5220.6 dated August 12,
1985, which directs that appeal boards may only affirm or

















Appeal determination date (first appeal)
MM,DD,YY - month, day, last two digits of year
Appealing party (first appeal)
1 - case appealed by government
2 - case appealed by applicant
Remand determination
1 - not applicable
2 - hearing determination affirmed
3 - hearing determination reversed
4 - remand in process
Remand determination date
MM,DD,YY - month, day, last two digits of year
Appeal determination (second appeal)
1 - not applicable
2 - hearing determination affirmed
3 - hearing determinatin reversed























Appealing party (second appeal)
1 - case appealed by government
2 - case appealed by applicant
Appeal determination date (second appeal)
MM,DD,YY - month, day, last two digits of year
Final case determination after all adjudication
complete
1 - clearance granted (any kind)
2 - clearance granted (confidential)
3 - clearance granted (secret)
4 - clearance granted (top secret)
5 - clearance denied/revoked
6 - adjudication in progress
Clearance held at time of application
1 - unknown
2 - none
3 - company confidential
4 - confidential
5 - secret
6 - top secret
Clearance suspended pending outcome
1 - no
2 - yes





3 - top secret
4 - unspecified





Part III. Applicant Information
SEX Applicant sex
line 2
62 1 - female
2 - male
AGE Applicant age on first hearing date
line 2
64-65 XX - age in years
MAR Marital status
line 2
67 1 - single
2 - married
3 - divorced
NCHILD Number of dependents other than spouse
line 2
69-70 XX - number of dependents
EDUC Education
line 2
72-73 1 - did not graduate high school
2 - high school graduate
3 - some college - did not graduate
4 - bachelor's degree
5 - some master's level work - did not graduate
6 - master's degree
7 - some doctoral level work - did not graduate
8 - doctoral degree
9 - some law school - did not graduate
10 - law school graduate
11 - some medical school - did not graduate
12 - medical school graduate
13 - associate's degree
SUP Most recent job held was supervisory in nature
line 2























staff technician (inspector, staff
specialist, purchasing agent)
maintenance technician (plumber,
electrician, mechanic, machine operator)
driver /mover
defense contractor employee (unspecified)
business owner
clerical (administrative assistant, typist,
secretary, clerk)
controller /accountant
board of directors/corporate officer
Part IV. Adjudication Policy Factors - Financial
FACTA1 Administrative judge cited Factor 1 (History of bad




FACTA2 Administrative judge cited Factor 2 (Recent




FACTA3 Administrative judge cited Factor 3 (Indebtedness
line 3 aggravated or caused by gambling, alcohol, drug








FACTA4 Administrative judge cited Factor 4 (History or




FACTA5 Administrative judge cited Factor 5 (Unfavorable





















Administrative judge cited Factor 6 (Deceit or
deception, embezzlement, or change of address
without advising creditors) against clearance
1 - no
2 - yes
Administrative judge cited Factor 7 (Applicant's
indifference to financial obligations or a stated




Administrative judge cited Factor 8 (Financial
mismanagement or irresponsible expenditures that
exceed income or other assets) against clearance
1 - no
2 - yes
Administrative judge cited Factor 1 (Systematic
efforts to satisfy creditors) supporting clearance
1 - no
2 - yes
Administrative judge cited Factor 2 (Favorable



















Administrative judge cited Factor 3 (Stable




Administrative judge cited Factor 4 (Circumstances




Administrative judge cited Factor 5 (Business-

















































Applicant's control over cause of indebtedness
1 - indebtedness caused or aggravated by
factors within applicant's control
(gambling, alcohol, drugs, lavish
lifestyle, carelessness, immaturity,
poor financial management)
2 - indebtedness due to factors beyond
applicant's control (divorce, unemployment,
illness, business failure)
Nature of mitigating circumstance, if applicable
- not applicable
1 - illness (applicant or family member)
2 - divorce
3 - business failure
4 - unemployment
5 - spousal spending
6 - taking in orphans or children of relatives
7 - victim of swindle
8 - supporting family while attending college
9 - pending dispute over amount due
Total number of delinquent debts
Total dollar amount of delinquent debts
Code $123,456,789.00 as 12345678900







Part VI . Bankruptcy
Number of bankruptcies in past year

































Number of bankruptcies more than three but less
than five years old
Number of bankruptcies more than five years old
Applicant control over bankruptcy
1 - bankruptcy aggravated by factors within
applicant's control (gambling, alcohol,
drugs, lavish lifestyle)
2 - bankruptcy due to factors beyond
applicant's control (divorce, unemployment,
illness, business)
3 - bankruptcy due to carelessness/poor
management
Total number of bankruptcies
Number of personal chapter 7 bankruptcies
(discharge of debts)
Number of personal chapter 13 bankruptcies
( reorganization
)
Number of business chapter 11 bankruptcies
Percent of bankruptcies that were business-related
Code 33.3% as 333 or 100.0% as 1000
(all subsequent percentages coded this way)






NLAS Number of debts incurred since last bankruptcy
line 4
19-20
DOLLAS Amount of debt incurred since last bankruptcy
line 4
22-32




Number of insufficient funds checks issued




Number of insufficient funds checks issued




Number of insufficient funds checks issued




Number of insufficient funds checks issued




Number of insufficient funds checks issued




Number of insufficient funds checks issued








































Total number of repossessions, judgments, liens,
garnishments, and foreclosures
IX. Financial Frauds
Number of financial frauds (phony checks, welfare,





Applicant displayed positive demeanor/attitude
towards indebtedness and intent to pay
1 - not mentioned or applicable
2 - displayed negative demeanor/attitude toward
debt or indifference or no intent to pay
3 - displayed positive demeanor/attitude toward
debt with intent to pay














XI. Applicant Payment Efforts
Applicant did not begin to contact creditors or pay




Evidence of rehabilitation, improved financial
habits before issuance of SOR
1 - applicant did not contact creditors or
adhere to payment plans
2 - applicant contacted creditors, set up and
adhered to payment plans or resumed regular
payments












Current relationship of monthly expenses to monthly
disposable income (disposable income equals gross
income minus taxes)
1 - monthly expenses exceeded monthly
disposable income
2 - monthly disposable income exceeded monthly
expenses
3 - monthly expenses equal monthly disposable
income





Amount by which monthly disposable income exceeds





DOLIN Current monthly disposable income
line 5
47-57
DOLX Current monthly fixed expenses/payments
line 5
59-69












XIII. Evidence of Stability
Employment longevity at current/most recent job
YYMM - number of years, number of months
(MM < 12)
example: applicant worked 1 and 1/2 years
code 0106
Employment longevity at second most recent job
Applicant produced letters of reference or








Number of federal tax non-filings











DOLCON Dollar amount of delinquent consumer debt
line 6 (i.e. department stores, charge cards, automobile,
34-44 bank accounts)
DOLHOM Dollar amount of delinquent housing debt (i.e.
line 6 rent, mortgage)
46-56
DOLMED Dollar amount of delinquent medical debt
line 6 (i.e. medical, dental)
58-68
DOLEDU Dollar amount of delinquent education debt (i.e.
line 7 loan, tuition)
1-11
DOLUTL Dollar amount of delinquent utility debt (i.e. gas,
line 7 electric, water, telephone)
13-23
DOLTAX Dollar amount of overdue federal/state/local taxes
line 7
25-35
DOLKID Dollar amount of delinquent child support/alimony
line 7 debts
37-47
DOLBUS Dollar amount of delinquent business debt
line 7
49-59
NCON Number of delinquent consumer debts
line 7
61-62







NMED Number of delinquent medical debts
line 7
67-68
NEDU Number of delinquent education debts
line 7
70-71
NUTL Number of delinquent utility debts
line 7
73-74
NTAX Number of delinquent tax debts
line 8
1-2
NKID Number of delinquent child support/alimony debts
line 8
4-5
NBUS Number of delinquent business debts
line 8
7-8
PDCON Percent total dollar of debt due to consumer debt
line 8
10-13
PDHOM Percent total dollar of debt due to housing debt
line 8
15-18
PDMED Percent total dollar of debt due to medical debt
line 8
20-23
PDEDU Percent total dollar of debt due to education debt
line 8
25-28
PDUTL Percent total dollar of debt due to utility debt
line 8
30-33







PDKID Percent total dollar of debt due to child
line 8 support/alimony debt
40-43
PDBUS Percent total dollar of debt due to business debt
line 8
45-48
PNCON Percent total number of debts due to consumer debt
line 8
50-53
PNHOM Percent total number of debts due to housing debt
line 8
55-58
PNMED Percent total number of debts due to medical debt
line 8
60-63
PNEDU Percent total number of debts due to education debt
line 8
65-68
PNUTL Percent total number of debts due to utility debt
line 8
70-73
PNTAX Percent total number of debts due to tax debt
line 9
1-4
PNKID Percent total number of debts due to child
line 9 support /alimony debt
6-9






Some of the frequently used terms in this thesis have
particular meanings within the context of the security
environment in general or the security clearance process in
particular. These are defined here.
1. Access - The ability and opportunity to obtain
knowledge or possession of classified information. [Ref
.
53:p. 11]
2. Adjudication - The determination, based on specific
criteria and past behavior, of the probability of an
applicant's future behavior having an adverse effect on
national security for the purpose of deciding whether the
applicant should or should not be granted a security
clearance. [Ref. 9:p. 56]
3. Adjudication Policy - Specific factors listed in DOD
Directive 5220.6 which adjudicators must consider in
adjudicating a particular type of case. For example,
judgments, liens, and repossessions must be considered in
financial cases. [Ref. l:p. 3-1] (See "factor")
4. Adjudicator - DISCR official who determines, based on
specific criteria and past behavior, the probability of an
applicant's future behavior having an adverse effect on
national security for the purpose of deciding whether the
applicant should or should not be granted a security
clearance. Individual may be a personnel security
specialist, administrative judge, or member of appeal
board. [Ref.9:p. 56]
5. Administrative Determination - A determination issued
without a hearing.
6. Administrative Judge - DISCR official who issues
determinations that either grant or deny security
clearances
.
7. Appeal Board - A panel of DISCR staff attorneys
designated to review determinations which are appealed.
The board will issue either a final determination
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affirming the administrative judge's determination or an
order for remand referring the determination back to the
administrative judge for redetermination (review) , further
investigation, or to permit additional evidence and/or
testimony into the record for consideration. [Ref. 1]
8. Applicant - A person in private industry who requires
a security clearance for access to classified information.
[Ref. l:p. 3]
9. Bench Decision - An examination of testimony and
evidence by an administrative judge without a jury for the
purpose of making a determination.
10. Bench Trial - A hearing without a jury convened by an
administrative judge for the purpose of making
a determination.
11. Classified Information - Official information which
has been determined to require, in the interest of
national security, protection against disclosure and which
has been so designated. [Ref. 53:p. 12]
12. Clearance - An authorization for a person to have
access to classified information provided his or her
duties so require.
13. Compromise - A security violation which has resulted
in confirmed or suspected exposure of classified
information or material to an unauthorized person.
[Ref.53:p. 12]
14. Confidential - The designation applied to information
or material the unauthorized disclosure of which could
reasonably be expected to cause identifiable damage to the
national security
.
[Ref . 9:p. 56]
15. Counsel - Attorney retained by applicant to represent
applicant in all proceedings.
16. Criteria - Those factors, and levels or thresholds
thereof, used to adjudicate cases. Also refers to broad
areas of conduct outlined in DOD Directive 5220.6, each of
which is associated with a letter used to label cases
involving that criterion. Examples include mental illness
("J"), financial irresponsibility ( "L" ) , and unreliability
("I"). (This thesis examines the financial criteria used
to adjudicate financial criterion "L" cases.) [Ref. l:pp.
5-7]
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17. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO) -
The office responsible for initiating investigations,
issuing clearances and maintaining clearance records for
DOD contractor (industrial) personnel. [Ref. 9:p. 56]
18. Defense Investigative Service (DIS) - DOD component
responsible for, among other things, conducting personnel
security investigations for DOD military, civilian and
contractor (industrial) personnel. [Ref.9:p. 56]
19. Department Counsel - DISCR attorneys who represent
the Department of Defense in all proceedings in an
applicant's case. [Ref. l:p. 1-2]
20. Determination - A decision by an administrative judge
to grant or deny a security clearance to a particular
applicant, either with ("hearing determination") or
without ("administrative determination") a hearing.
21. Directorate for Industrial Security Clearance Review
(DISCR) - The office responsible for adjudicating those
industrial cases that DISCO could not approve for
clearance. [Ref. l:p. 2]
22. Factor - Quantitative and/or qualitative aspects of
a case used in its adjudication. DOD Directive 5220.6
specifies some general and specific factors which
adjudicators must consider in clearance determinations.
Examples of general factors, which apply to all types of
cases, are: frequency of the conduct, motivation of the
applicant, and probability of recurrence [Ref. l:p. 5].
Specific factors, termed "adjudication policy", apply only
to certain types of cases. (See "adjudication policy").
23. Factor against clearance - A factor which supports
the denial or revocation of a clearance. (See "factor")
24. Factor for clearance - A mitigating factor which
supports the granting of a clearance. (See "factor")
25. Final determination - Determination of an
administrative judge which is not appealed, or if
appealed, is affirmed by the appeal board.
26. Hearing - A proceeding convened and conducted by an
administrative judge for the purpose of determining an
applicant's eligibility for clearance.
27. Hearing Determination - A determination issued after
a hearing.
28. Industrial Applicant - Same as "applicant."
Ill
29. Industry - Private firms that require access to
classified information in order to provide goods and
services to DOD.
30. Mitigating Circumstance/Factor - Same as "factor for
clearance"
.
31. Order for Remand - Decision made by an appeal board
to refer a determination back to the administrative judge
who issued it for the purpose of redetermination (review),
further investigation, or to permit the admittance of
additional evidence or testimony into the case record.
32. Personnel Investigations Center (PIC) - Branch of DIS
tasked with performing personnel security investigations.
33. Personnel Security Clearance - Same as "clearance".
34 . Personnel Security Specialist - A type of DISCR
adjudicator in one of three personnel security divisions
(PSD) who may grant clearances or issue a statement of
reasons as to why a clearance cannot be granted.
35. Redetermination - Review by administrative judge of
his or her own initial determination which was remanded by
the appeal board. The administrative judge will either
affirm the initial determination or issue a new
determination
.
36. Remand - To refer a determination back to the
administrative judge who issued it for the purpose of
redetermination (review), further investigation, or to
permit the admittance of additional evidence or testimony
into the case record. Appeal boards have the authority to
remand cases.
37. Secret - The designation applied to information or
material the unauthorized disclosure of which could
reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the
national security. [Ref. 9:p. 57]
38. Security Clearance - Same as "clearance".
39. Statement of Reasons (SOR) - A statement issued by
DISCR setting forth the reasons an applicant's security
clearance may be denied, suspended, or revoked.
40. Top Secret - The designation applied to information
or material the unauthorized disclosure of which could
reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage
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CATEGORIES OF ADJUDICATION CRITERIA
A. Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage,
treason, terrorism, anarchy, sedition, or attempts thereat or
preparation therefor, or conspiring with or aiding or abetting
another to commit or attempt to commit any such act.
B. Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with
a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, terrorist,
revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or
similar representative of a foreign nation whose interests may
be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any
person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow
the Government of the United States or to alter the form of
Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
C. Advocacy or use of force or violence to overthrow the
Government of the United States or to alter the form of
government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
D. Knowning membership with the specific intent of furthering
the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in any
foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group
or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as
organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the
commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from
exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of any State or which seeks to overthrow the
Government of the United States or any State or subdivision
thereof by unlawful means.
E. Unauthorized disclosure to any person of classified
information, or of other information, disclosure of which is
prohibited by Statute, Executive Order or Regulation.
F. Performing or attempting to perform one's duties, or
otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another
government in preference to the interests of the United
States
.
G. Disregard of public law, Statutes, Executive Orders or




H. Criminal or dishonest conduct or acts of sexual
perversion.
I. Acts of omission or commission that indicate poor
judgment, unreliability or untrustworthiness
.
J. Any illness, including any mental condition, which, in the
opinion of competent medical authority, may cause significant
defect in judgment or reliability with due regard to the
transient or continuing effect of the illness and the medical
findings in such case.
K. Vulnerability to coercion, influence, or pressure that may
cause conduct contrary to the national interest. This may be
( 1 ) the presence of immediate family members or other persons
to whom the applicant is bonded by affection or obligation in
a nation (or areas under its domination) whose interests may
be inimical to those of the United States, or (2) any other
circumstances that could cause the applicant to be vulnerable.
L. Excessive indebtedness, recurring financial difficulties,
or unexplained affluence.
M. Habitual or episodic use of intoxicants to excess.
N. Illegal or improper use, possession, transfer, sale or
addiction to any controlled or psychoactive substance,
narcotic, cannabis or other dangerous drug.
0. Any knowing and willful falsification, cover-up,
concealment, misrepresentation, or omission of a material fact
from any written or oral statement, document, form or other
representation or device used by the Department of Defense or
any other Federal agency.
P. Failing or refusing to answer or to authorize others to
answer questions or provide information required by a
congressional committee, court or agency in the course of an
official inquiry whenever such answers or information concern
relevant and material matters pertinent to an evaluation of
the individual's trustworthiness, reliability, and judgment.




Basis: Failure to meet just and avoidable financial
obligations voluntarily incurred.
Factors Which May be Considered in Determining Whether to Deny
or Revoke Clearance:
1. History of bad debts and unmanageable indebtedness.
2. Recent bankruptcy with continuing financial problems.
3. Indebtedness aggravated or caused by gambling,
alcohol, drug abuse, or mental or emotional defects.
4. A history or pattern of writing checks not covered by
sufficient funds.
5. Unfavorable judgments, liens, or repossessions.
6. Deceit or deception, embezzlement, or change of
address without advising creditors.
7. Applicant's indifference to financial obligations or
a stated intention not to meet these obligations in
the future.
8. Financial mismanagement or irresponsible
expenditures that exceed income or other assets.
Mitigating Factors:
1. Systematic efforts to satisfy creditors.
2. Favorable change in financial habits.
3. Stable employment record and favorable references.
4. Circumstances beyond the individual's control
contributing to indebtedness; e.g., major illness,
debilitation, decrease or cutoff of income, and
indebtedness due to court order.
5. Business-related bankruptcy.











17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31















47 48 49 50 51 52
DSORI
53 54 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
DSORA
Line 2
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72
DHR
















32 33 34 35 36
DDETR





45 46 47 48 49 50
DDETA2
51 52 54 56 58 60
DETFIN CHELD CSUS CREQ
Part III
62 64 65 67 69 70 72 73 75
SEX AGE MAR NDEP EDUC SUP
















16 18 20 22 24 26 28


















54 55 56 57 58 59 60
DOLDET
61 62 63 64
Part VI Line 4
66 68 70 72 74 1 3 5











22 23 24 25 26 27 28
DOLLAS




40 41 43 44 46 47 49 50 52 53
NSUF6M NSUF1Y NSUF3Y NSUF5Y NSUFT
54
Part VIII






Line 5 Part IX Part X
74 75 12 4 5 7 8 10 11 13
NLIEN NGARN NFORE NFIVE NFRAUD ATT
art XI Part XII
15 17 19 21 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
PAYSOR REHAB DISBK RELATE DOLXIN
35363738 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 47484950 51 52 53 54 55 56 57
DOLINX DOLIN
Line 6
59606162 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 12345 6 7 8 9 10 11
DOLX DOLGRO
Part XII][ I>art XIV










34 35 36 37 38 39 40
DOLCON
41 42 43 44
46474849 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 58596061 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
DOLHOM DOLMED
Line 7
12 3 4 5 6 7 8
DOLEDU
10 11 13141516 17 18 19 20
DOLUTIL
21 22 23
25262728 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 37383940 41 42 43 44
DOLTAX DOLKID
45 46 47
49505152 53 54 55 56
DOLBUS

















10 11 12 13
PDCON
15 16 17 18
PDHOM
20 21 22 23
PDMED
25 26 27 28
PDEDU
30 31 32 33
PDUTL
35 36 37 38
PDTAX
40 41 42 43
PDKID
45 46 47 48
PDBUS
120
50 51 52 53
PNCON
55 56 57 5!
PNHOM
60 61 62 63
PNMED
65 66 67 68
PNEDU
Line 9










1. U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program,
Washington, DC, 12 August 1985.
2. U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Security Review
Commission, Keeping The Nation' s Secrets: A Report to the
Secretary of Defense, Government Printing Office, Washington,
DC, November 1985.
3. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Personnel Security-
Research and Education Center, Unclassified Letter:
65HT/1059RES to Defense Investigative Service, Subject:
Financial Criteria Used by DISCR for Denying a Clearance;
Research Proposal, 26 December 1989.
4. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Personnel Security
Research and Education Center, Report PERS-TN-87-007
,
Personnel Security and Reliability: Psychological Research
Issues, by M. F. Wiskoff, Monterey, CA, October 1987.
5. U.S. Congress, 100th, 1st sess., House, Select Committee
on Intelligence, United States Counterintelligence and
Security Concerns--1986 , Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC, 1987.
6. U.S. Congress, 98th, 1st sess., Senate, Committee on
Governmental Affairs, National Security Decision Directive 84,
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1984.
7. U.S. Congress, 101st, 1st sess., House, Committee on Post
Office and Civil Service, Subcommittee on Civil Service,
Proposed Changes to Security Clearance Programs , Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1989.
8. U.S. Congress, 101st, 2nd sess., Senate, Select Committee
on Intelligence, S. 2726, Counterintelligence Improvements Act
of 1990 (proposed) , Washington, DC, July 1990.
9. U.S. General Accounting Office, The Comptroller General,
Report GGD-8 1-105, Report to the Congress of the United
States: Faster Processing of DOD Personnel Security Clearances
Could Avoid Millions in Losses, Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC, 15 September 1981.
122
10. U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Industrial Security
Review Committee, A Report to the Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy, Washington, DC, 10 December 1984.
11. U.S. Congress, 99th, 1st sess., Senate, Committee on
Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Investigations, Federal
Governnment Security Clearance Programs , Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC, 1985.
12. Burris, G. W. , Major, USAF, Reliability in the Air
Force's Personnel Security Program , Student Report, Air
Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force
Base, AL, April 1986.
13. U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and
International Affairs Division, Report GAO/NSIAD-89-21
,
Security Investigations: State Department Employee
Investigation Practices Can Be Improved, Washington, DC,
November 1988.
14. U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and
International Affairs Division, Report GAO/NSIAD-89-86 , State
Department: Security Issues Related to Selected Employees
Washington, DC, December 1988.
15. U.S. General Accounting Office; Resources, Community, and
Economic Development Division; Report GAO/RCED-89-34 , Nuclear
Security: DOE Actions to Improve the Personnel Clearance
Program, Washington, DC, November 1988.
16. U.S. General Accounting Office; Resources, Community, and
Economic Development Division; Report GAO/RCED-89-4 1 , Nuclear
Regulation: NRC ' s Security Clearance Program Can Be
Strengthened , Washington, DC, December 1988.
17. U.S. General Accounting Office, Report GAO/T-RCED-89- 14,
Testimony: Weaknesses in NRC ' s Security Clearance Program,
Washington, DC, 15 March 1989.
18. U.S. Congress, 100th, 2nd sess., House, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Counterintelligence and
Security Concerns : A Status Report, Personnel and Information
Security , Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1988.
19. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Investigative
Service, DIS, 1990.
20. U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and
International Affairs Division, Report GAO/NSIAD 87-170BR.
National Security: DOD Clearance Reduction and Related Issues,
Washington, DC, September 1987.
123
21. O'Brien, T. J., "The Changing Face of DOD Security,"
Security Management , July 1988.
22. Bodzin, M. B. , A Literature Survey of Private Sector
Methods of Determining Personal Financial Responsibility
,
Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate Shool, Monterey, CA,
September 1988.
23. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Investigative
Service, Dis Manual 20-1-M, Manual for Personnel Security
Investigations , Washington, DC, December 1988.
24. Sewell, C, "The Proof is in the Past," Security
Management, November 1986.
25. Peters, R. B. , "In Hiring, When is a Risk a Risk?"
Security Management , August 1985.
26. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Personnel Security
Research and Education Center, Report PERS-TR-90-006
Investigative Report Writing: A Field Study, by J. E. Suchan,
Monterey, CA, December 1989.
27. Personnel Decisions Research Institutes, Inc., Report
160, The Investigative Interview: A Review of Practice and
Related Research , by M. Bosshardt, D. Dubois, C. Paullin, and
G. Carter, Minneapolis, MN, November 1988.
28. HumRRO International, Inc., Report 87-02, Determination
of Training Requirements--Personnel Security Specialists
(Adjudicators) , by J. Marshall-Mies, Alexandria, VA, June
1987.
29. HumRRhO International, Inc., Job/Task Analysis for DOD
Adjudicators--Phase A: Job Tasks for DOD Adjudicators , by J.
M. Marshall-Mies, K. Rigg, and F. Harding, Arlington, VA,
September 1989.
30. HumRRho International, Inc., Report 87-04, Personnel
Security Adjudicators : Results of a Semi-Structured Interview,
by J. P. Ziemak and J. H. Laurence, Alexandria, VA, August
1987.
31. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Personnel Security
Research and Education Center, Report PERS-TR-88-004 , Due
Process in Matters of Clearance Denial and Revocation: A
Review of the Case Law by John Norton Moore, Esq., Ronald L.
Plesser, Esq., and Emilio Jaksetic, Esq., by E . V. Haag and R.
Denk, April 1988.
124
32. Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information Within Industry, Eisenhower, Dwight D.,
Washington, DC, 24 February 1960.
33. Novak, V., "Suspect," Common Cause, May-June 1989.
34. Edelhertz, H., "White-Collar and Professional Crime: The
Challenge for the 1980 's," American Behavioral Scientist , v.
27, September-October 1983.
35. Britton, H., "The Serious Threats of White Collar Crime,"
Vital Speeches of the Day, v. 47, 1 June 1981.
36. Bologna, J., "Why Employees Steal--CPAs and DPers Views,"
Security Management , September 1980.
37. Bequai, A., "The Industrial Spy," Security Management,
August 1985.
38. McGowan, W. , "The Great White-Collar Crime Coverup,
"Business and Society Review, Spring 1983.
39. Fotheringham, A., "For This is the Law--and the Profits,"
Macleans, v. 93, 7 April 1980.
40. Kuhn, R. A., "Secrets of Successful Screening," Security
Management, September 1988.
41. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Personnel Security
Research and Education Center, Report PERS-TR-87-004 , A Survey
of Economic Models of Criminal Behavior , by W. J. Haga,
October 1987.
42. Tersine, R. J., and Russell, R. S., "Internal Theft: The
Multi-Billion-Dollar Disappearing Act," Business Horizons , v.
24, November-December 1981.
43. Walls, Jr., J. D., "Putting a Premium on Honesty,"
Security Management , September 1988.
44. McNamara, Francis J., U.S. Counterintelligence Today, The
Nathan Hale Institute, 1985.
45. Department of Defense Security Institute, Security
Awareness News, Richmond, VA, November 1989.
46. Department of Defense Security Institute, Recent
Espionage Cases: Summaries and Sources , Richmond, VA,
February 1988.
125
47. Department of Defense Security Institute, Security
Awareness News, Richmond, VA, April 1990.
48. Department of Defense Security Institute, Security
Awareness News, Richmond, VA, May 1990.
49. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Personnel Security
Research and Education Center, Report PERS-TR-87-003
,
Personnel Security Prescreening: An Application of the Armed
Services Applicant Profile (ASAP), by K. S. Crawford and T.
Trent, Monterey, CA, October 1987.
50. McDaniel, M. A., "Biographical Constructs for Predicting
Employee Suitability," Journal of Applied Psychology , v. 74,
June 1989.
51. U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense
Directive 5200. 2-R, Personnel Security Program Regulation
Washington, DC, January 1987.
52. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI
Detailed Report, December 1989, February 1990.
53. Teates, J. F. , An Exploratory Analysis of Misconduct
Behavior within the Radioman Rate and its Potential Effect on
Security , Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA, June 1986.
54. Bordens, K. S., Research Design and Methods, Mayfield




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 52 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
3. Dr. James M. Fremgen 1
Naval Postgraduate School, Code AS/FM
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
4. Dr. Howard W. Timm 1
Defense Personnel Security Research
and Education Center, Code 65
Naval Postgraduate School, Building 455
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
5. Dr. John R. Goral 1
Defense Manpower Data Center
99 Pacific Street, Suite 155A
Monterey, CA 93940-2453








1900 Half Street, S. W.
Washington, D.C. 20324-1700
8. Mr. Leon J. Schachter 1
Department of Defense
Defense Legal Services Agency
Directorate for Industrial Security
Clearance Review (DISCR)
Post Office Box 3656
Arlington, VA 22203-0656
9. LT Janet G. Goldstein 2
Post Office Box 62362












in case adjudication by





3 2768 00033284 5
